The Design and Implementation of a Secure Auction Service
IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering
The MBONE: the Internet's other backbone
Crossroads - Special issue on networks
The inductive approach to verifying cryptographic protocols
Journal of Computer Security
The Byzantine Generals Problem
ACM Transactions on Programming Languages and Systems (TOPLAS)
Information and Computation
The verification of an industrial payment protocol: the SET purchase phase
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
IPDPS '05 Proceedings of the 19th IEEE International Parallel and Distributed Processing Symposium (IPDPS'05) - Workshop 12 - Volume 13
Journal of Computer Security - Special issue on ACM conference on computer and communications security, 2001
Formal Correctness of Security Protocols (Information Security and Cryptography)
Formal Correctness of Security Protocols (Information Security and Cryptography)
Formal Models and Analysis of Secure Multicast in Wired and Wireless Networks
Journal of Automated Reasoning
Secure Multiparty Computation Goes Live
Financial Cryptography and Data Security
Decidable Analysis for a Class of Cryptographic Group Protocols with Unbounded Lists
CSF '09 Proceedings of the 2009 22nd IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium
Attacking Group Multicast Key Management Protocols Using Coral
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science (ENTCS)
Multi-Attacker Protocol Validation
Journal of Automated Reasoning
Attacking and Fixing Helios: An Analysis of Ballot Secrecy
CSF '11 Proceedings of the 2011 IEEE 24th Computer Security Foundations Symposium
Verification of security protocols with lists: from length one to unbounded length
POST'12 Proceedings of the First international conference on Principles of Security and Trust
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Multicast, originally designed as an efficient way of broadcasting content, is being used in security protocols. Multicast security protocols are difficult to verify using model checking because they typically involve a large number of participants. Likewise, the exponential growth of knowledge being distributed during protocol run. From a specification point of view, multicast is also a general way of representing message casting in protocol verification, with unicast, anycast and broadcast as special cases. Using the inductive method of protocol verification and Isabelle/HOL, we have devised techniques for specifying multicast protocols and proving many of their essential properties. We show secrecy proofs for a mixed environment protocol as a case. Our contributions are twofold: A usable multicast specification using the inductive method and the assertion that protocols should be verified by default using a multicast specification.