On Name Generation and Set-Based Analysis in the Dolev-Yao Model
CONCUR '02 Proceedings of the 13th International Conference on Concurrency Theory
Normalizable Horn Clauses, Strongly Recognizable Relations, and Spi
SAS '02 Proceedings of the 9th International Symposium on Static Analysis
Towards an Automatic Analysis of Security Protocols in First-Order Logic
CADE-16 Proceedings of the 16th International Conference on Automated Deduction: Automated Deduction
Rewriting for Cryptographic Protocol Verification
CADE-17 Proceedings of the 17th International Conference on Automated Deduction
Abstracting Cryptographic Protocols with Tree Automata
SAS '99 Proceedings of the 6th International Symposium on Static Analysis
Protocol insecurity with a finite number of sessions and composed keys is NP-complete
Theoretical Computer Science
An NP Decision Procedure for Protocol Insecurity with XOR
LICS '03 Proceedings of the 18th Annual IEEE Symposium on Logic in Computer Science
Formal methods for cryptographic protocol analysis: emerging issues and trends
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Selecting theories and recursive protocols
CONCUR 2005 - Concurrency Theory
Selecting theories and nonce generation for recursive protocols
Proceedings of the 2007 ACM workshop on Formal methods in security engineering
Transducer-based analysis of cryptographic protocols
Information and Computation
Approximation-based tree regular model-checking
Nordic Journal of Computing
Handling algebraic properties in automatic analysis of security protocols
ICTAC'06 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Theoretical Aspects of Computing
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We prove that, if the initial knowledge of the intruder is given by a deterministic bottom-up tree automaton, then the insecurity problem for cryptographic protocols with atomic keys for a bounded number of sessions is NP-complete. We prove also that if regural languages (given by tree automata) are used in protocol descriptions to restrict the form of messages, then the insecurity problem is NexpTime-complete. Furthermore, we define a class of cryptographic protocols, called regular protocols, such that the knowledge which the intruder can gain during an unlimited number of sessions of a protocol is a regular language.