Protocol insecurity with a finite number of sessions and composed keys is NP-complete

  • Authors:
  • Michaël Rusinowitch;Mathieu Turuani

  • Affiliations:
  • LORIA-INRIA, Université Henri Poincaré, 54506 Vandoeuvre-les-Nancy Cedex, France and INRIA, Lorraine Technopole de Nancy-Brabois, 615, r. Jardin Botanique, B.P. 101 Campus Scientifique, ...;LORIA-INRIA, Université Henri Poincaré, 54506 Vandoeuvre-les-Nancy Cedex, France

  • Venue:
  • Theoretical Computer Science
  • Year:
  • 2003

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Abstract

We investigate the complexity of the protocol insecurity problem for a finite number of sessions (fixed number of interleaved runs). We show that this problem is NP-complete with respect to a Dolev-Yao model of intruders. The result does not assume a limit on the size of messages and supports non-atomic symmetric encryption keys. We also prove that in order to build an attack with a fixed number of sessions the intruder needs only to forge messages of linear size, provided that they are represented as dags.