Introduction to algorithms
Protocol insecurity with a finite number of sessions and composed keys is NP-complete
Theoretical Computer Science
Efficient Authentication and Signing of Multicast Streams over Lossy Channels
SP '00 Proceedings of the 2000 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
SAT-based model-checking for security protocols analysis
International Journal of Information Security
Timed analysis of security protocols
Journal of Computer Security - Formal Methods in Security Engineering Workshop (FMSE 04)
Specification and Verification of Protocols With Time Constraints
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science (ENTCS)
Automated Security Protocol Analysis With the AVISPA Tool
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science (ENTCS)
A simple language for real-time cryptographic protocol analysis
ESOP'03 Proceedings of the 12th European conference on Programming
The AVISPA tool for the automated validation of internet security protocols and applications
CAV'05 Proceedings of the 17th international conference on Computer Aided Verification
RTA'06 Proceedings of the 17th international conference on Term Rewriting and Applications
On the security of public key protocols
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
Formal methods for cryptographic protocol analysis: emerging issues and trends
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Editorial: Recent developments in high performance computing and security: An editorial
Future Generation Computer Systems
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In this paper we study the protocol insecurity problem for time-dependent security protocols under the finite number of sessions' assumption, extending to the timed case, previous results obtained for the same problem in the untimed case. In particular, we propose a timed specification language, which allows to model temporal features typically involved in the implementation of security protocols. We introduce a stronger version of the Dolev-Yao intruder, by allowing it to generate new timestamps which can affect the execution of a protocol sensitive to their temporal validity. We prove that this temporal extension together with the increased power of the intruder model do not affect the complexity of the protocol insecurity problem, which remains NP-complete as in the untimed case.