Transition system specifications with negative premises
Theoretical Computer Science
Information and Computation
Communication and Concurrency
A comparison of three authentication properties
Theoretical Computer Science - Special issue: Algebraic methodology and software technology
Extending Process Languages with Time
AMAST '97 Proceedings of the 6th International Conference on Algebraic Methodology and Software Technology
Analysing Time Dependent Security Properties in CSP Using PVS
ESORICS '00 Proceedings of the 6th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security
Analysing a Stream Authentication Protocol Using Model Checking
ESORICS '02 Proceedings of the 7th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security
On Compositional Reasoning in the Spi-calculus
FoSSaCS '02 Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Foundations of Software Science and Computation Structures
A Hierarchy of Authentication Specifications
CSFW '97 Proceedings of the 10th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Protocol Independence through Disjoint Encryption
CSFW '00 Proceedings of the 13th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Authenticity in a reliable protocol for mobile computing
Proceedings of the 2003 ACM symposium on Applied computing
Real-time information flow analysis
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Timed model checking of security protocols
Proceedings of the 2004 ACM workshop on Formal methods in security engineering
Non-interference proof technique for the analysis of cryptographic protocols
Journal of Computer Security - Special issue on WITS'03
Timed spi-calculus with types for secrecy and authenticity
CONCUR 2005 - Concurrency Theory
Timed Automata with Data Structures for Distributed Systems Design and Analysis
SEFM '05 Proceedings of the Third IEEE International Conference on Software Engineering and Formal Methods
Information flow in secure contexts
Journal of Computer Security
Information flow security in dynamic contexts
Journal of Computer Security
Modelling and Checking Timed Authentication of Security Protocols
Fundamenta Informaticae - Special Issue on Concurrency Specification and Programming (CS&P)
Modeling and Verifying Time Sensitive Security Protocols with Constraints
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science (ENTCS)
Timed analysis of security protocols
Journal of Computer Security - Formal Methods in Security Engineering Workshop (FMSE 04)
Constraint Abstraction in Verification of Security Protocols
FAW '08 Proceedings of the 2nd annual international workshop on Frontiers in Algorithmics
Timed Automata Based Model Checking of Timed Security Protocols
Fundamenta Informaticae - Concurrency Specification and Programming (CS&P)
Unwinding in Information Flow Security
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science (ENTCS)
Specification and Verification of Protocols With Time Constraints
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science (ENTCS)
Fast certificate-based authentication scheme in multi-operator maintained wireless mesh networks
Computer Communications
Is your security protocol on time?
FSEN'07 Proceedings of the 2007 international conference on Fundamentals of software engineering
Constraints solution for time sensitive security protocols
FAW'07 Proceedings of the 1st annual international conference on Frontiers in algorithmics
Timed Automata Based Model Checking of Timed Security Protocols
Fundamenta Informaticae - Concurrency Specification and Programming (CS&P)
Modelling and Checking Timed Authentication of Security Protocols
Fundamenta Informaticae - Special Issue on Concurrency Specification and Programming (CS&P)
Timed protocol insecurity problem is NP-complete
Future Generation Computer Systems
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A real-time process algebra, enhanced with specific constructs for handling cryptographic primitives, is proposed to model cryptographic protocols in a simple way.We show that some security properties, such as authentication and secrecy, can be re-formulated in this timed setting. Moreover, we show that they can be seen as suitable instances of a general information flow-like scheme, called tGNDC, parametric w.r.t. the observational semantics of interest.We show that, when considering timed trace semantics, there exists a most powerful hostile environment (or enemy) that can try to compromise the protocol. Moreover, we hint some compositionality results.