ACM Transactions on Computer Systems (TOCS)
An attack on the Needham-Schroeder public-key authentication protocol
Information Processing Letters
Proceedings of the DIMACS/SYCON workshop on Hybrid systems III : verification and control: verification and control
Casper: a compiler for the analysis of security protocols
Journal of Computer Security
Experimenting with STA, a tool for automatic analysis of security protocols
Proceedings of the 2002 ACM symposium on Applied computing
Handbook of Applied Cryptography
Handbook of Applied Cryptography
Analysing Time Dependent Security Properties in CSP Using PVS
ESORICS '00 Proceedings of the 6th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security
A Semantic Model for Authentication Protocols
SP '93 Proceedings of the 1993 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Timed model checking of security protocols
Proceedings of the 2004 ACM workshop on Formal methods in security engineering
SAT-Based Verification of Security Protocols Via Translation to Networks of Automata
Model Checking and Artificial Intelligence
An Optimized Intruder Model for SAT-based Model-Checking of Security Protocols
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science (ENTCS)
A simple language for real-time cryptographic protocol analysis
ESOP'03 Proceedings of the 12th European conference on Programming
√erics: a tool for verifying timed automata and estelle specifications
TACAS'03 Proceedings of the 9th international conference on Tools and algorithms for the construction and analysis of systems
Is your security protocol on time?
FSEN'07 Proceedings of the 2007 international conference on Fundamentals of software engineering
The AVISPA tool for the automated validation of internet security protocols and applications
CAV'05 Proceedings of the 17th international conference on Computer Aided Verification
LDYIS: a Framework for Model Checking Security Protocols
Fundamenta Informaticae - Concurrency Specification and Programming (CS&P)
Is your security protocol on time?
FSEN'07 Proceedings of the 2007 international conference on Fundamentals of software engineering
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In this paper we offer a novel methodology for verifying correctness of (timed) security protocols. The idea consists in computing the time of a correct execution of a session and finding out whether the Intruder can change it to shorter or longer by an active attack. Moreover, we generalize the correspondence property so that attacks can be also discovered when some time constraints are not satisfied. An implementation of our method is described. As case studies we verify generalized (timed) authentication of KERBEROS, TMN, Neumann Stubblebine Protocol, Andrew Secure Protocol,Wide Mouthed Frog, and NSPK.