Experimenting with STA, a tool for automatic analysis of security protocols

  • Authors:
  • Michele Boreale;Maria Grazia Buscemi

  • Affiliations:
  • Università di Firenze, Via Lombroso 6/17, 50134 Firenze, Italy;Università di Catania, Viale Doria 6, 95125 Catania, Italy

  • Venue:
  • Proceedings of the 2002 ACM symposium on Applied computing
  • Year:
  • 2002

Quantified Score

Hi-index 0.00

Visualization

Abstract

We present STA (Symbolic Trace Analyzer), a tool for the analysis of security protocols. STA relies on symbolic techniques that avoid explicit construction of the whole, possibly infinite, state-space of protocols. This results in accurate protocol modeling, increased efficiency and more direct formalization, when compared to finite-state techniques. We illustrate the use of STA by analyzing the well-known asymmetric Needham Schroeder protocol. We discuss the results of this analysis, and contrast them with previous work based on finite-state model checking.