The Interrogator: Protocol Secuity Analysis
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ACM Transactions on Computer Systems (TOCS)
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ACM SIGPLAN Notices - Haskell special issue
Verifying Authentication Protocols in CSP
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Breaking and Fixing the Needham-Schroeder Public-Key Protocol Using FDR
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A Tool for Lazy Verification of Security Protocols
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ISICT '03 Proceedings of the 1st international symposium on Information and communication technologies
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Journal of Computer Security - 7th International Workshop on Issues in the Theory of Security (WITS'07)
FC'10 Proceedings of the 14th international conference on Financial cryptograpy and data security
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SAFECOMP'06 Proceedings of the 25th international conference on Computer Safety, Reliability, and Security
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Security protocols are used to exchange information in a distributed system with the aim of providing security guarantees. We present an approach to modeling security protocols using lazy data types in a higher-order functional programming language. Our approach supports the formalization of protocol models in a natural and high-level way, and the automated analysis of safety properties using infinite-state model checking, where the model is explicitly constructed in a demand-driven manner. We illustrate these ideas with an extended example: modeling and checking the Needham-Schroeder public-key authentication protocol.