The AVISS Security Protocol Analysis Tool

  • Authors:
  • Alessandro Armando;David A. Basin;Mehdi Bouallagui;Yannick Chevalier;Luca Compagna;Sebastian Mödersheim;Michaël Rusinowitch;Mathieu Turuani;Luca Viganò;Laurent Vigneron

  • Affiliations:
  • -;-;-;-;-;-;-;-;-;-

  • Venue:
  • CAV '02 Proceedings of the 14th International Conference on Computer Aided Verification
  • Year:
  • 2002

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Abstract

We introduce AVISS, a tool for security protocol analysis that supports the integration of back-ends implementing different search techniques, allowing for their systematic and quantitative comparison and paving the way to their effective interaction. As a significant example, we have implemented three back-ends, and used the AVISS tool to analyze and find flaws in 36 protocols, including 31 problems in the Clark-Jacob's protocol library and a previously unreported flaw in the Denning-Sacco protocol.