Casper: a compiler for the analysis of security protocols
Journal of Computer Security
A key distribution protocol using event markers
ACM Transactions on Computer Systems (TOCS)
A compiler for analyzing cryptographic protocols using noninterference
ACM Transactions on Software Engineering and Methodology (TOSEM)
Validating firewalls using flow logics
Theoretical Computer Science
A Bound on Attacks on Authentication Protocols
TCS '02 Proceedings of the IFIP 17th World Computer Congress - TC1 Stream / 2nd IFIP International Conference on Theoretical Computer Science: Foundations of Information Technology in the Era of Networking and Mobile Computing
The AVISS Security Protocol Analysis Tool
CAV '02 Proceedings of the 14th International Conference on Computer Aided Verification
Nordic Journal of Computing
Flow logic: a multi-paradigmatic approach to static analysis
The essence of computation
Protocols for Key Establishment and Authentication
Protocols for Key Establishment and Authentication
An Efficient Cryptographic Protocol Verifier Based on Prolog Rules
CSFW '01 Proceedings of the 14th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Authenticity by Typing for Security Protocols
CSFW '01 Proceedings of the 14th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
A calculus for control flow analysis of security protocols
International Journal of Information Security - Special issue on security in global computing
Static validation of security protocols
Journal of Computer Security
Security properties: two agents are sufficient
ESOP'03 Proceedings of the 12th European conference on Programming
| Hi-index | 0.00 |
The security of a network protocol crucially relies on the scenario in which the protocol is deployed. This paper describes syntactic constructs for modelling network scenarios and presents an automated analysis tool, which can guarantee that security properties hold in all of the (infinitely many) instances of a scenario. The tool is based on control flow analysis of the process calculus LySa and is applied to the Bauer, Berson, and Feiertag protocol where is reveals a previously undocumented problem, which occurs in some scenarios but not in other.