Static validation of security protocols
Journal of Computer Security
Deriving the type flaw attacks in the Otway-Rees protocol by rewriting
Nordic Journal of Computing - Selected papers of the 17th nordic workshop on programming theory (NWPT'05), October 19-21, 2005
Nordic Journal of Computing - Selected papers of the 17th nordic workshop on programming theory (NWPT'05), October 19-21, 2005
Cryptographic Pattern Matching
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science (ENTCS)
On the semantics of Alice&Bob specifications of security protocols
Theoretical Computer Science - Automated reasoning for security protocol analysis
A framework for security analysis of mobile wireless networks
Theoretical Computer Science - Automated reasoning for security protocol analysis
Detecting and Preventing Type flaws: a Control Flow Analysis with Tags
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science (ENTCS)
Computer Languages, Systems and Structures
ICLP '09 Proceedings of the 25th International Conference on Logic Programming
Formalizing and Analyzing the Needham-Schroeder Symmetric-Key Protocol by Rewriting
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science (ENTCS)
Securing Statically-verified Communications Protocols Against Timing Attacks
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science (ENTCS)
A Quantitative Study of Two Attacks
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science (ENTCS)
From Flow Logic to static type systems for coordination languages
Science of Computer Programming
Detecting and preventing type flaws at static time
Journal of Computer Security - Security Issues in Concurrency (SecCo'07)
Program analysis and compilation, theory and practice
A design environment for mobile applications
IPDPS'06 Proceedings of the 20th international conference on Parallel and distributed processing
Modal abstractions of concurrent behavior
ACM Transactions on Computational Logic (TOCL)
Automated analysis of infinite scenarios
TGC'05 Proceedings of the 1st international conference on Trustworthy global computing
On evaluating the performance of security protocols
PaCT'05 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Parallel Computing Technologies
Analyzing security protocols in hierarchical networks
ATVA'06 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Automated Technology for Verification and Analysis
SAFECOMP'12 Proceedings of the 2012 international conference on Computer Safety, Reliability, and Security
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The design of a process calculus for analysing security protocols is governed by three factors: expressing the security protocol in a precise and faithful manner, accommodating the variety of attack scenarios, and utilising the strengths (and limit the weaknesses) of the underlying analysis methodology. We pursue an analysis methodology based on control flow analysis in flow logic style, whose ability to analyse a variety of security protocols we have shown previously [7]. This paper develops a calculus, LySans, which allows for much greater control and clarity in the description of attack scenarios, gives a more flexible format for expressing protocols, and at the same time allows one to circumvent some of the ‘false positives’ arising in [7].