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Information and Computation
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ESORICS '96 Proceedings of the 4th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security: Computer Security
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SAS '02 Proceedings of the 9th International Symposium on Static Analysis
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RTA '98 Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Rewriting Techniques and Applications
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CADE-17 Proceedings of the 17th International Conference on Automated Deduction
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CTRS '92 Proceedings of the Third International Workshop on Conditional Term Rewriting Systems
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CSFW '97 Proceedings of the 10th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
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SP '97 Proceedings of the 1997 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
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Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science (ENTCS)
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CAV'05 Proceedings of the 17th international conference on Computer Aided Verification
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This paper presents an approach to formalizing and verifying security protocol specifications based on rewriting techniques. A rewrite system Rp describes the steps of a protocol and the properties under consideration, and a rewrite system RI defines an intruder's ability of decomposing and decrypting messages. The equational theory generated by R = RP∪RI characterizes the recognizability of terms by an intruder, i.e. how an intruder can learn (parts of) messages exchanged among principals communicating over an insecure network. Security properties, such as authentication and secrecy, can be expressed by means of intruder's recognizability, and verifying whether a term is recognized by an intruder reduces to checking whether such a term can be rewritten to a normal form in the intruder's initial knowledge. A rewriting strategy is defined that, given a term t that represents a property to be proved, suitably expands and reduces t using the rules in R to derive whether or not t is recognized by an intruder. The approach is applied on the Otway-Rees symmetric-key protocol by deriving its well-known type flaw attacks.