On Bisimulations for the Spi Calculus
AMAST '02 Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Algebraic Methodology and Software Technology
Automatic testing equivalence verification of spi calculus specifications
ACM Transactions on Software Engineering and Methodology (TOSEM)
On bisimulations for the spi calculus
Mathematical Structures in Computer Science
Deriving the type flaw attacks in the Otway-Rees protocol by rewriting
Nordic Journal of Computing - Selected papers of the 17th nordic workshop on programming theory (NWPT'05), October 19-21, 2005
Secure implementations of typed channel abstractions
Proceedings of the 34th annual ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages
Improving the security of industrial networks by means of formal verification
Computer Standards & Interfaces
A Logical Characterisation of Static Equivalence
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science (ENTCS)
A bisimulation for dynamic sealing
Theoretical Computer Science
Implementing Spi Calculus Using Nominal Techniques
CiE '08 Proceedings of the 4th conference on Computability in Europe: Logic and Theory of Algorithms
ICALP '08 Proceedings of the 35th international colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming, Part II
Tools for cryptographic protocols analysis: A technical and experimental comparison
Computer Standards & Interfaces
Models and Proofs of Protocol Security: A Progress Report
CAV '09 Proceedings of the 21st International Conference on Computer Aided Verification
Formalising Observer Theory for Environment-Sensitive Bisimulation
TPHOLs '09 Proceedings of the 22nd International Conference on Theorem Proving in Higher Order Logics
Formalizing and Analyzing the Needham-Schroeder Symmetric-Key Protocol by Rewriting
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science (ENTCS)
A trace based bisimulation for the spi calculus: an extended abstract
APLAS'07 Proceedings of the 5th Asian conference on Programming languages and systems
Security protocols: principles and calculi tutorial notes
Foundations of security analysis and design IV
Encoding Cryptographic Primitives in a Calculus with Polyadic Synchronisation
Journal of Automated Reasoning
A testing theory for a higher-order cryptographic language
ESOP'11/ETAPS'11 Proceedings of the 20th European conference on Programming languages and systems: part of the joint European conferences on theory and practice of software
A fully abstract encoding of the π-calculus with data terms
ICALP'05 Proceedings of the 32nd international conference on Automata, Languages and Programming
Towards a symbolic bisimulation for the spi calculus
MSN'05 Proceedings of the First international conference on Mobile Ad-hoc and Sensor Networks
Automatic detection of attacks on cryptographic protocols: a case study
DIMVA'05 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Detection of Intrusions and Malware, and Vulnerability Assessment
Evaluation technique in the spicalculus for cryptographic protocols
ISIICT'09 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Innovation and Information and Communication Technology
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Contextual equivalences for cryptographic process calculi, like the spi-calculus, can be used to reason about correctness of protocols, but their definition suffers from quantification over all possible contexts. Here, we focus on two such equivalences, namely may-testing and barbed equivalence, and investigate tractable proof methods for them. To this aim, we design an enriched labelled transition system, where transitions are constrained by the knowledge the environment has of names and keys. The new transition system is then used to define a trace equivalence and a weak bisimulation equivalence that avoid quantification over contexts. Our main results are soundness and completeness of trace and weak bisimulation equivalence with respect to may-testing and barbed equivalence, respectively. They lead to more direct proof methods for equivalence checking. The use of these methods is illustrated with a few examples concerning implementation of secure channels and verification of protocol correctness.