A theory of bisimulation for the &lgr;-calculus
Acta Informatica
A calculus for cryptographic protocols: the spi calculus
Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Lazy functions and mobile processes
Proof, language, and interaction
Mobile values, new names, and secure communication
POPL '01 Proceedings of the 28th ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages
PI-Calculus: A Theory of Mobile Processes
PI-Calculus: A Theory of Mobile Processes
Proof Techniques for Cryptographic Processes
SIAM Journal on Computing
On the expressive power of polyadic synchronisation in π-calculus
Nordic Journal of Computing
Spi Calculus Translated to "--Calculus Preserving May-Tests
LICS '04 Proceedings of the 19th Annual IEEE Symposium on Logic in Computer Science
On bisimulations for the spi calculus
Mathematical Structures in Computer Science
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We thoroughly study the behavioural theory of epi, a 驴-calculus extended with polyadic synchronisation. We show that the natural contextual equivalence, barbed congruence, coincides with early bisimilarity, which is thus its co-inductive characterisation. Moreover, we relate early bisimilarity with the other usual notions, ground, late and open, obtaining a lattice of equivalence relations that clarifies the relationship among the "standard" bisimilarities. Furthermore, we apply the theory developed to obtain an expressiveness result: epi extended with key encryption primitives may be fully abstractly encoded in the original epi calculus. The proposed encoding is sound and complete with respect to barbed congruence; hence, cryptographic epi (crypto-epi) gets behavioural theory for free, which contrasts with other process languages with cryptographic constructs that usually require a big effort to develop such theory. Therefore, it is possible to use crypto-epi to analyse and to verify properties of security protocols using equational reasoning. To illustrate this claim, we prove compliance with symmetric and asymmetric cryptographic system laws, and the correctness of a protocol of secure message exchange.