Selected papers of the Second Workshop on Concurrency and compositionality
Models for concurrency: towards a classification
Theoretical Computer Science
A calculus for cryptographic protocols
Information and Computation
Multisets and structural congruence of the pi-calculus with replication
Theoretical Computer Science
Using encryption for authentication in large networks of computers
Communications of the ACM
CCS '01 Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Computer and Communications Security
On the relationship between strand spaces and multi-agent systems
CCS '01 Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Computer and Communications Security
Constraint solving for bounded-process cryptographic protocol analysis
CCS '01 Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Computer and Communications Security
The faithfulness of abstract protocol analysis: message authentication
CCS '01 Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Computer and Communications Security
Authentication tests and the structure of bundles
Theoretical Computer Science
A Petri Net Semantics for pi-Calculus
CONCUR '95 Proceedings of the 6th International Conference on Concurrency Theory
Milner's Communicationg Systmes and Petri Nets
Selected Papers from the 3rd European Workshop on Applications and Theory of Petri Nets
Petri nets and algebraic calculi of processes
Advances in Petri Nets 1985, covers the 6th European Workshop on Applications and Theory in Petri Nets-selected papers
CAPSL Interface for the NRL Protocol Analyzer
ASSET '99 Proceedings of the 1999 IEEE Symposium on Application - Specific Systems and Software Engineering and Technology
Proving Properties of Security Protocols by Induction
CSFW '97 Proceedings of the 10th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
A Meta-Notation for Protocol Analysis
CSFW '99 Proceedings of the 12th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
CSFW '99 Proceedings of the 12th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Honest Functions and their Application to the Analysis of Cryptographic Protocols
CSFW '99 Proceedings of the 12th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Athena: a New Efficient Automatic Checker for Security Protocol Analysis
CSFW '99 Proceedings of the 12th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Invariant Generation Techniques in Cryptographic Protocol Analysis
CSFW '00 Proceedings of the 13th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Strand Spaces and Rank Functions: More than Distant Cousins
CSFW '02 Proceedings of the 15th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
A Compositional Logic for Protocol Correctness
CSFW '01 Proceedings of the 14th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Multiset rewriting and the complexity of bounded security protocols
Journal of Computer Security
A comparison between strand spaces and multiset rewriting for security protocol analysis
ISSS'02 Proceedings of the 2002 Mext-NSF-JSPS international conference on Software security: theories and systems
Deriving the type flaw attacks in the Otway-Rees protocol by rewriting
Nordic Journal of Computing - Selected papers of the 17th nordic workshop on programming theory (NWPT'05), October 19-21, 2005
Theoretical Computer Science - Automated reasoning for security protocol analysis
On the relationships between models in protocol verification
Information and Computation
Formalizing and Analyzing the Needham-Schroeder Symmetric-Key Protocol by Rewriting
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science (ENTCS)
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Formal analysis of security protocols is largely based on a set of assumptions commonly referred to as the Dolev-Yao model. Two formalisms that state the basic assumptions of this model are related here: strand spaces and multiset rewriting with existential quantification. Strand spaces provide a simple and economical approach to analysis of completed protocol runs by emphasizing causal interactions among protocol participants. The multiset rewriting formalism provides a very precise way of specifying finite-length protocols with unboundedly many instances of each protocol role, such as client, server, initiator, or responder. A number of modifications to each system are required to produce a meaningful comparison. In particular, we extend the strand formalism with a way of incrementally growing bundles in order to emulate an execution of a protocol with parametric strands. The correspondence between the modified formalisms directly relates the intruder theory from the multiset rewriting formalism to the penetrator strands. The relationship we illustrate here between multiset rewriting specifications and strand spaces thus suggests refinements to both frameworks, and deepens our understanding of the Dolev-Yao model.