Efficient and timely mutual authentication
ACM SIGOPS Operating Systems Review
ACM Transactions on Computer Systems (TOCS)
A note on the use of timestamps as nonces
ACM SIGOPS Operating Systems Review
Strand spaces: proving security protocols correct
Journal of Computer Security
Protocol Interactions and the Chosen Protocol Attack
Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Security Protocols
Casper: A Compiler for the Analysis of Security Protocols
CSFW '97 Proceedings of the 10th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Proving Properties of Security Protocols by Induction
CSFW '97 Proceedings of the 10th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Honest Ideals on Strand Spaces
CSFW '98 Proceedings of the 11th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Two attacks on Neuman-Stubblebine authentication protocols
Information Processing Letters
On the relationship between strand spaces and multi-agent systems
CCS '01 Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Computer and Communications Security
Security analysis of the cliques protocols suites: first results
Sec '01 Proceedings of the 16th international conference on Information security: Trusted information: the new decade challenge
Authentication tests and the structure of bundles
Theoretical Computer Science
On the relationship between strand spaces and multi-agent systems
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
The Logic of Authentication Protocols
FOSAD '00 Revised versions of lectures given during the IFIP WG 1.7 International School on Foundations of Security Analysis and Design on Foundations of Security Analysis and Design: Tutorial Lectures
Security Goals: Packet Trajectories and Strand Spaces
FOSAD '00 Revised versions of lectures given during the IFIP WG 1.7 International School on Foundations of Security Analysis and Design on Foundations of Security Analysis and Design: Tutorial Lectures
ESORICS '02 Proceedings of the 7th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security
Strand Spaces and Rank Functions: More than Distant Cousins
CSFW '02 Proceedings of the 15th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
How to prevent type flaw attacks on security protocols
Journal of Computer Security - CSFW13
A Security Analysis of the Cliques Protocols Suites
CSFW '01 Proceedings of the 14th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Study on strand space model theory
Journal of Computer Science and Technology
Proceedings of the 2003 ACM workshop on Formal methods in security engineering
A comparison between strand spaces and multiset rewriting for security protocol analysis
Journal of Computer Security
A derivation system and compositional logic for security protocols
Journal of Computer Security
Protocol Composition Logic (PCL)
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science (ENTCS)
A formal semantics for protocol narrations
Theoretical Computer Science
A framework for compositional verification of security protocols
Information and Computation
Compositionality of Security Protocols: A Research Agenda
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science (ENTCS)
Verification of authentication protocols based on the binding relation
ISSS'02 Proceedings of the 2002 Mext-NSF-JSPS international conference on Software security: theories and systems
Environmental requirements for authentication protocols
ISSS'02 Proceedings of the 2002 Mext-NSF-JSPS international conference on Software security: theories and systems
A comparison between strand spaces and multiset rewriting for security protocol analysis
ISSS'02 Proceedings of the 2002 Mext-NSF-JSPS international conference on Software security: theories and systems
Model checking the security of multi-protocol systems
CTS'05 Proceedings of the 2005 international conference on Collaborative technologies and systems
Analysing TLS in the strand spaces model
Journal of Computer Security
Establishing and preserving protocol security goals
Journal of Computer Security - Foundational Aspects of Security
Hi-index | 0.00 |
Strand space analysis is a method for stating and proving correctness properties for cryptographic protocols. In this paper we apply the same method to the related problem of mixed protocols, and show that a protocol can remain correct even when used in combination with a range of other protocols.We illustrate the method with the familiar Otway-Rees protocol. We identify a simple and easily verified characteristic of protocols, and show that the Otway-Rees protocol remains correct even when used in combination with other protocols that have this characteristic.We also illustrate this method on the Neuman-Stubblebine protocol. This protocol has two parts, an authentication protocol (I) in which a key distribution center creates and distributes a Kerberos-like key, and a re-authentication protocol (II) in which a client resubmits a ticket containing that key. The re-authentication protocol II is known to be flawed. We show that in the presence of protocol II, there are also attacks against protocol I. We then define a variant of protocol II, and prove an authentication property of I that holds even in combination with the modified II.