Mixed Strand Spaces

  • Authors:
  • F. Javier Thayer;Jonathan C. Herzog;Joshua D. Guttman

  • Affiliations:
  • -;-;-

  • Venue:
  • CSFW '99 Proceedings of the 12th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
  • Year:
  • 1999

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Abstract

Strand space analysis is a method for stating and proving correctness properties for cryptographic protocols. In this paper we apply the same method to the related problem of mixed protocols, and show that a protocol can remain correct even when used in combination with a range of other protocols.We illustrate the method with the familiar Otway-Rees protocol. We identify a simple and easily verified characteristic of protocols, and show that the Otway-Rees protocol remains correct even when used in combination with other protocols that have this characteristic.We also illustrate this method on the Neuman-Stubblebine protocol. This protocol has two parts, an authentication protocol (I) in which a key distribution center creates and distributes a Kerberos-like key, and a re-authentication protocol (II) in which a client resubmits a ticket containing that key. The re-authentication protocol II is known to be flawed. We show that in the presence of protocol II, there are also attacks against protocol I. We then define a variant of protocol II, and prove an authentication property of I that holds even in combination with the modified II.