How to prevent type flaw attacks on security protocols

Authors:
James Heather;Gavin Lowe;Steve Schneider
Affiliations:
Department of Computing, School of Electronics, Computing and Mathematics, University of Surrey, Guildford, Surrey GU2 7XH, UK;Programming Research Group, Oxford University Computing Laboratory, Wolfson Building, Parks Road, Oxford OX1 3QD, UK;Royal Holloway, University of London, Egham Hill, Egham, Surrey TW20 0EX, UK
Venue:
Journal of Computer Security - CSFW13
Year:
2003

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Abstract

A type flaw attack on a security protocol is an attack where a field that was originally intended to have one type is subsequently interpreted as having another type. A number of type flaw attacks have appeared in the academic literature. In this paper we prove that type flaw attacks can be prevented using a simple technique of tagging each field with some information indicating its intended type.