Fault-perserving simplifying transformations for security protocols
Journal of Computer Security
Analyzing the Needham-Schroeder Public-Key Protocol: A Comparison of Two Approaches
ESORICS '96 Proceedings of the 4th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security: Computer Security
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Journal of Computer Security - CSFW13
Abstraction and Refinement in Protocol Derivation
CSFW '04 Proceedings of the 17th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
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CSFW '05 Proceedings of the 18th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Preventing type flaw attacks on security protocols with a simplified tagging scheme
ISICT '04 Proceedings of the 2004 international symposium on Information and communication technologies
A derivation system and compositional logic for security protocols
Journal of Computer Security
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International Journal of Information Security
Transformations between Cryptographic Protocols
Foundations and Applications of Security Analysis
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FSTTCS'07 Proceedings of the 27th international conference on Foundations of software technology and theoretical computer science
Strong Invariants for the Efficient Construction of Machine-Checked Protocol Security Proofs
CSF '10 Proceedings of the 2010 23rd IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium
Deriving secrecy in key establishment protocols
ESORICS'06 Proceedings of the 11th European conference on Research in Computer Security
Security goals and protocol transformations
TOSCA'11 Proceedings of the 2011 international conference on Theory of Security and Applications
CSF '12 Proceedings of the 2012 IEEE 25th Computer Security Foundations Symposium
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We propose a class of protocol transformations, which can be used to (1) develop (families of) security protocols by refinement and (2) abstract existing protocols to increase the efficiency of verification tools. We prove the soundness of these transformations with respect to an expressive security property specification language covering secrecy and authentication properties. Our work clarifies and significantly extends the scope of earlier work in this area. We illustrate the usefulness of our approach on a family of key establishment protocols.