A note on the use of timestamps as nonces
ACM SIGOPS Operating Systems Review
A lesson on authentication protocol design
ACM SIGOPS Operating Systems Review
Using encryption for authentication in large networks of computers
Communications of the ACM
Analyzing the Needham-Schroeder Public-Key Protocol: A Comparison of Two Approaches
ESORICS '96 Proceedings of the 4th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security: Computer Security
Proving Security Protocols Correct
LICS '99 Proceedings of the 14th Annual IEEE Symposium on Logic in Computer Science
A Hierarchy of Authentication Specifications
CSFW '97 Proceedings of the 10th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
How to Prevent Type Flaw Attacks on Security Protocols
CSFW '00 Proceedings of the 13th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Bounding messages for free in security protocols
FSTTCS'07 Proceedings of the 27th international conference on Foundations of software technology and theoretical computer science
Sound security protocol transformations
POST'13 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Principles of Security and Trust
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A type flaw attack on a security protocol is an attack where a field in a message that was originally intended to have one type is subsequently interpreted as having another type. Heather et al. proves that type flaw attacks can be prevented with the technique of tagging each field with the information that indicates its intended type. We simplify Heather et al.'s tagging scheme by combining all the tags inside each encrypted component into a single tag and by omitting the tags on the outmost level. The simplification reduces the sizes of messages in the security protocol. We also formally prove our simplified tagging scheme is as secure as Heather et al.'s with the strand space method. Note that Heather et al.'s tagging scheme and our simplified tagging are applicable to, not just one protocol, but a variety of security protocols.