Towards a completeness result for model checking of security protocols
Journal of Computer Security
Constraint solving for bounded-process cryptographic protocol analysis
CCS '01 Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Computer and Communications Security
How to prevent type flaw attacks on security protocols
Journal of Computer Security - CSFW13
Protocol Insecurity with Finite Number of Sessions is NP-Complete
CSFW '01 Proceedings of the 14th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Preventing type flaw attacks on security protocols with a simplified tagging scheme
ISICT '04 Proceedings of the 2004 international symposium on Information and communication technologies
Verification of cryptographic protocols: tagging enforces termination
Theoretical Computer Science - Foundations of software science and computation structures
Safely composing security protocols
FSTTCS'07 Proceedings of the 27th international conference on Foundations of software technology and theoretical computer science
Bounding messages for free in security protocols
FSTTCS'07 Proceedings of the 27th international conference on Foundations of software technology and theoretical computer science
Deciding key cycles for security protocols
LPAR'06 Proceedings of the 13th international conference on Logic for Programming, Artificial Intelligence, and Reasoning
From One Session to Many: Dynamic Tags for Security Protocols
LPAR '08 Proceedings of the 15th International Conference on Logic for Programming, Artificial Intelligence, and Reasoning
Safely composing security protocols
Formal Methods in System Design
Bounding messages for free in security protocols
FSTTCS'07 Proceedings of the 27th international conference on Foundations of software technology and theoretical computer science
Security protocol verification: symbolic and computational models
POST'12 Proceedings of the First international conference on Principles of Security and Trust
Diffie-Hellman without difficulty
FAST'11 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Formal Aspects of Security and Trust
Sound security protocol transformations
POST'13 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Principles of Security and Trust
POST'13 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Principles of Security and Trust
Composition of password-based protocols
Formal Methods in System Design
Efficient construction of machine-checked symbolic protocol security proofs
Journal of Computer Security
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The verification of security protocols has been proven to be undecidable in general. Different approaches use simplifying hypotheses in order to obtain decidability for interesting subclasses. Amongst the most common is type abstraction, i.e. considering only well-typed runs, therefore bounding message length. In this paper, we show how to get message boundedness "for free" under a reasonable (syntactic) assumption on protocols, which we call well-formedness. This enables us to improve existing decidability results.