Safely composing security protocols

  • Authors:
  • Véronique Cortier;Jérémie Delaitre;Stéphanie Delaune

  • Affiliations:
  • LORIA, CNRS & INRIA, Nancy, France;LORIA, CNRS & INRIA, Nancy, France;LORIA, CNRS & INRIA, Nancy, France

  • Venue:
  • FSTTCS'07 Proceedings of the 27th international conference on Foundations of software technology and theoretical computer science
  • Year:
  • 2007

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Abstract

Security protocols are small programs that are executed in hostile environments. Many results and tools have been developed to formally analyze the security of a protocol. However even when a protocol has been proved secure, there is absolutely no guarantee if the protocol is executed in an environment where other protocols, possibly sharing some common identities and keys like public keys or long-term symmetric keys, are executed. In this paper, we show that whenever a protocol is secure, it remains secure even in an environment where arbitrary protocols are executed, provided each encryption contains some tag identifying each protocol, like e.g. the name of the protocol.