Prudent Engineering Practice for Cryptographic Protocols
IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering
On Name Generation and Set-Based Analysis in the Dolev-Yao Model
CONCUR '02 Proceedings of the 13th International Conference on Concurrency Theory
Protocol Interactions and the Chosen Protocol Attack
Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Security Protocols
Protocol insecurity with a finite number of sessions and composed keys is NP-complete
Theoretical Computer Science
Casper: A Compiler for the Analysis of Security Protocols
CSFW '97 Proceedings of the 10th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Athena: a New Efficient Automatic Checker for Security Protocol Analysis
CSFW '99 Proceedings of the 12th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
An Efficient Cryptographic Protocol Verifier Based on Prolog Rules
CSFW '01 Proceedings of the 14th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Verification of cryptographic Protocols: tagging enforces termination
FOSSACS'03/ETAPS'03 Proceedings of the 6th International conference on Foundations of Software Science and Computation Structures and joint European conference on Theory and practice of software
RTA'03 Proceedings of the 14th international conference on Rewriting techniques and applications
Environmental requirements for authentication protocols
ISSS'02 Proceedings of the 2002 Mext-NSF-JSPS international conference on Software security: theories and systems
Safely composing security protocols
FSTTCS'07 Proceedings of the 27th international conference on Foundations of software technology and theoretical computer science
Protocol Composition for Arbitrary Primitives
CSF '10 Proceedings of the 2010 23rd IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium
SP'96 Proceedings of the 1996 IEEE conference on Security and privacy
The AVISPA tool for the automated validation of internet security protocols and applications
CAV'05 Proceedings of the 17th international conference on Computer Aided Verification
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Security protocols are small distributed programs that are designed to ensure security over untrusted networks such as the Internet. They are notoriously dificult to design and flaws can be found several years after their publication and even their deployment. In particular, they are not securely composable in general: two protocols may be secure when analyzed separately but may cause harmful interactions to each other. We explore how tagging protocols allows to securely compose protocols.