The faithfulness of abstract protocol analysis: message authentication
CCS '01 Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Computer and Communications Security
Authentication tests and the structure of bundles
Theoretical Computer Science
Security Goals: Packet Trajectories and Strand Spaces
FOSAD '00 Revised versions of lectures given during the IFIP WG 1.7 International School on Foundations of Security Analysis and Design on Foundations of Security Analysis and Design: Tutorial Lectures
ESORICS '02 Proceedings of the 7th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security
Strand Spaces and Rank Functions: More than Distant Cousins
CSFW '02 Proceedings of the 15th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Security Protocol Design via Authentication Tests
CSFW '02 Proceedings of the 15th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
A simple framework for real-time cryptographic protocol analysis with compositional proof rules
Science of Computer Programming - Special issue on 12th European symposium on programming (ESOP 2003)
Authenticity by tagging and typing
Proceedings of the 2004 ACM workshop on Formal methods in security engineering
Proceedings of the 2003 ACM workshop on Formal methods in security engineering
The faithfulness of abstract protocol analysis: message authentication
Journal of Computer Security - Special issue on ACM conference on computer and communications security, 2001
Tailoring the Dolev-Yao abstraction to web services realities
Proceedings of the 2005 workshop on Secure web services
To infinity and beyond or, avoiding the infinite in security protocol analysis
Proceedings of the 2006 ACM symposium on Applied computing
A derivation system and compositional logic for security protocols
Journal of Computer Security
Verification of cryptographic protocols: tagging enforces termination
Theoretical Computer Science - Foundations of software science and computation structures
Protocol Composition Logic (PCL)
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science (ENTCS)
Authentication tests and disjoint encryption: A design method for security protocols
Journal of Computer Security - Special issue on CSFW15
A calculus of challenges and responses
Proceedings of the 2007 ACM workshop on Formal methods in security engineering
A formal semantics for protocol narrations
Theoretical Computer Science
A framework for compositional verification of security protocols
Information and Computation
Dynamic types for authentication
Journal of Computer Security - Formal Methods in Security Engineering Workshop (FMSE 04)
Safely composing security protocols
Formal Methods in System Design
Cryptographic Protocol Composition via the Authentication Tests
FOSSACS '09 Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on Foundations of Software Science and Computational Structures: Held as Part of the Joint European Conferences on Theory and Practice of Software, ETAPS 2009
Tags for Multi-Protocol Authentication
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science (ENTCS)
Compositionality of Security Protocols: A Research Agenda
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science (ENTCS)
Environmental requirements for authentication protocols
ISSS'02 Proceedings of the 2002 Mext-NSF-JSPS international conference on Software security: theories and systems
A simple language for real-time cryptographic protocol analysis
ESOP'03 Proceedings of the 12th European conference on Programming
Safely composing security protocols
FSTTCS'07 Proceedings of the 27th international conference on Foundations of software technology and theoretical computer science
Detecting and preventing type flaws at static time
Journal of Computer Security - Security Issues in Concurrency (SecCo'07)
Compositional System Security with Interface-Confined Adversaries
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science (ENTCS)
Sequential protocol composition in maude-NPA
ESORICS'10 Proceedings of the 15th European conference on Research in computer security
Ubiquitous verification of ubiquitous systems
SEUS'10 Proceedings of the 8th IFIP WG 10.2 international conference on Software technologies for embedded and ubiquitous systems
Understanding abstractions of secure channels
FAST'10 Proceedings of the 7th International conference on Formal aspects of security and trust
Programming cryptographic protocols
TGC'05 Proceedings of the 1st international conference on Trustworthy global computing
Trusted multiplexing of cryptographic protocols
FAST'09 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Formal Aspects in Security and Trust
Static analysis of authentication
Foundations of Security Analysis and Design III
A sound decision procedure for the compositionality of secrecy
ESSoS'12 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Engineering Secure Software and Systems
Constructive cryptography --- a new paradigm for security definitions and proofs
TOSCA'11 Proceedings of the 2011 international conference on Theory of Security and Applications
Security goals and protocol transformations
TOSCA'11 Proceedings of the 2011 international conference on Theory of Security and Applications
Soundness of removing cancellation identities in protocol analysis under Exclusive-OR
TOSCA'11 Proceedings of the 2011 international conference on Theory of Security and Applications
Provably repairing the ISO/IEC 9798 standard for entity authentication
POST'12 Proceedings of the First international conference on Principles of Security and Trust
Sessions and separability in security protocols
POST'13 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Principles of Security and Trust
Composition of password-based protocols
Formal Methods in System Design
Analysing TLS in the strand spaces model
Journal of Computer Security
Provably repairing the ISO/IEC 9798 standard for entity authentication
Journal of Computer Security - Security and Trust Principles
Establishing and preserving protocol security goals
Journal of Computer Security - Foundational Aspects of Security
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One protocol (called the primary protocol) is independent of other protocols (jointly called the secondary protocol) if the question whether the primary protocol achieves a security goal never depends on whether the secondary protocol is in use.In this paper, we use multiprotocol strand Spaces {ThayerHerzogGuttman99a}, cf. {ThayerHerzogGuttman99}) to prove that two cryptographic protocols are independent if they use encryption in non-overlapping ways. This theorem (Proposition {prop: prot: independence}) applies even if the protocols share public key certificates and secret key 驴tickets.驴We use the method of {GuttmanThayer00a, GuttmanThayer00} to study penetrator paths, namely sequences of penetrator actions connecting regular nodes (message transmissions or receptions) in the two protocols. Of special interest are inbound linking paths, which lead from a message transmission in the secondary protocol to a message reception in the primary protocol. We show how to modify any bundle to remove all inbound linking paths, if encryption does not overlap in the two protocols. The resulting bundle no longer depends on any activity of the secondary protocol.We illustrate this method using the Neuman-Stubblebine protocol as an example {NeumanStubblebine93, ThayerHerzogGuttman99a}.