ACM SIGOPS Operating Systems Review
Relations between secrets: two formal analyses of the Yahalom protocol
Journal of Computer Security
Authentication tests and the structure of bundles
Theoretical Computer Science
Secrecy types for asymmetric communication
Theoretical Computer Science - Foundations of software science and computation structures
A Hierarchy of Authentication Specifications
CSFW '97 Proceedings of the 10th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Protocol Independence through Disjoint Encryption
CSFW '00 Proceedings of the 13th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
How to Prevent Type Flaw Attacks on Security Protocols
CSFW '00 Proceedings of the 13th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Types and Effects for Asymmetric Cryptographic Protocols
CSFW '02 Proceedings of the 15th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Authenticity by Typing for Security Protocols
CSFW '01 Proceedings of the 14th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Automated analysis of cryptographic protocols using Mur/spl phi/
SP '97 Proceedings of the 1997 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Journal of Computer Security - Special issue on ACM conference on computer and communications security, 2001
The ρ-spi Calculus at Work: Authentication Case Studies
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science (ENTCS)
A framework for compositional verification of security protocols
Information and Computation
Detecting and preventing type flaws at static time
Journal of Computer Security - Security Issues in Concurrency (SecCo'07)
Ubiquitous verification of ubiquitous systems
SEUS'10 Proceedings of the 8th IFIP WG 10.2 international conference on Software technologies for embedded and ubiquitous systems
Journal of Computer Security - Foundational Aspects of Security
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Formal methods have been proved successful in analyzing different kinds of security protocols. They typically formalize and study the security guarantees provided by cryptographic protocols, when executed by a (possibly unbounded) number of different participants. A key problem in applying formal methods to cryptographic protocols, is the study of multi-protocol systems, where different protocols are concurrently executed. This scenario is particularly interesting in a global computing setting, where several different security services coexist and are possibly combined together. In this paper, we discuss how the tagging mechanism presented in [M. Bugliesi, R. Focardi, and M. Maffei. Compositional analysis of authentication protocols. In Proceedings of European Symposium on Programming (ESOP 2004), volume 2986 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 140-154. Springer-Verlag, 2004, M. Bugliesi, R.Focardi, and M.Maffei. A theory of types and effects for authentication. In ACM Proceedings of Formal Methods for Security Engineering: from Theory to Practice (FMSE 2004), pages 1-12. ACM Press, October 2004] addresses this issue.