Prudent Engineering Practice for Cryptographic Protocols
IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering
A calculus for cryptographic protocols
Information and Computation
Inductive analysis of the Internet protocol TLS
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Risks of the passport single signon protocol
Proceedings of the 9th international World Wide Web conference on Computer networks : the international journal of computer and telecommunications netowrking
The inductive approach to verifying cryptographic protocols
Journal of Computer Security
Breaking and Fixing the Needham-Schroeder Public-Key Protocol Using FDR
TACAs '96 Proceedings of the Second International Workshop on Tools and Algorithms for Construction and Analysis of Systems
Formal Verification of Cryptographic Protocols: A Survey
ASIACRYPT '94 Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptology: Advances in Cryptology
On the Security of Joint Signature and Encryption
EUROCRYPT '02 Proceedings of the International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques: Advances in Cryptology
Protocol Independence through Disjoint Encryption
CSFW '00 Proceedings of the 13th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Limitations on Design Principles for Public Key Protocols
SP '96 Proceedings of the 1996 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Cryptographic protocols
A composable cryptographic library with nested operations
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Security Analysis of the SAML Single Sign-on Browser/Artifact Profile
ACSAC '03 Proceedings of the 19th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
A semantics for web services authentication
Proceedings of the 31st ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages
Symmetric Encryption in a Simulatable Dolev-Yao Style Cryptographic Library
CSFW '04 Proceedings of the 17th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Verifying policy-based security for web services
Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Using static analysis to validate the SAML single sign-on protocol
WITS '05 Proceedings of the 2005 workshop on Issues in the theory of security
XML signature element wrapping attacks and countermeasures
Proceedings of the 2005 workshop on Secure web services
Proving a WS-federation passive requestor profile with a browser model
Proceedings of the 2005 workshop on Secure web services
Secure sessions for web services
SWS '04 Proceedings of the 2004 workshop on Secure web service
Analysis of the SSL 3.0 protocol
WOEC'96 Proceedings of the 2nd conference on Proceedings of the Second USENIX Workshop on Electronic Commerce - Volume 2
Compiling and verifying security protocols
LPAR'00 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Logic for programming and automated reasoning
Browser model for security analysis of browser-based protocols
ESORICS'05 Proceedings of the 10th European conference on Research in Computer Security
On breaking SAML: be whoever you want to be
Security'12 Proceedings of the 21st USENIX conference on Security symposium
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Web Services are an important series of standards for adding semantics to web-based and XML-based communication. For analyzing the security of Web Services protocols composed of these standards, it is tempting to exploit their similarity to traditional security protocols by first transforming them into the Dolev-Yao abstraction, where cryptographic operators are treated symbolically as constructors of a free algebra, and as a second step by applying existing symbolic techniques for machine-assisted or even fully automated protocol verification within this abstraction.We show in this paper that this approach tends to ignore intrinsic aspects of Web Services standards and protocols and to hence be too coarse-grained for capturing Web Services security in all its facets. We identify a series of such aspects both on the conceptual level and on the level of concrete Web Services protocols: service requestors and providers have additional properties independent of the protocol under consideration and hence offer additional attack possibilities, protocol behaviors can be defined by explicit Web Services policies and complex message parsings which do not necessarily follow the common Dolev-Yao-style parsing conventions, etc. We sketch in a series of examples how to exploit these aspects for mounting successful attacks against Web Services protocols, and we discuss possibilities to circumvent these attacks. In particular, this exemplifies the need for tailoring Dolev-Yao abstractions specifically to Web Services idiosyncrasies, which go beyond the standard Dolev-Yao assumptions.