Prudent Engineering Practice for Cryptographic Protocols
IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering
An attack on a recursive authentication protocol. A cautionary tale
Information Processing Letters
The inductive approach to verifying cryptographic protocols
Journal of Computer Security
Relations between secrets: two formal analyses of the Yahalom protocol
Journal of Computer Security
Kerberos Version 4: Inductive Analysis of the Secrecy Goals
ESORICS '98 Proceedings of the 5th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security
What do we mean by entity authentication?
SP '96 Proceedings of the 1996 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Analysis of the SSL 3.0 protocol
WOEC'96 Proceedings of the 2nd conference on Proceedings of the Second USENIX Workshop on Electronic Commerce - Volume 2
Finite-state analysis of SSL 3.0
SSYM'98 Proceedings of the 7th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 7
The verification of an industrial payment protocol: the SET purchase phase
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
An environment for security protocol intrusion detection
Journal of Computer Security
Planning Attacks to Security Protocols: Case Studies in Logic Programming
Computational Logic: Logic Programming and Beyond, Essays in Honour of Robert A. Kowalski, Part I
Cryptographic Salt: A Countermeasure against Denial-of-Service Attacks
ACISP '01 Proceedings of the 6th Australasian Conference on Information Security and Privacy
Mechanical Proofs about a Non-repudiation Protocol
TPHOLs '01 Proceedings of the 14th International Conference on Theorem Proving in Higher Order Logics
On the Security of RSA Encryption in TLS
CRYPTO '02 Proceedings of the 22nd Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
A Top-Down Look at a Secure Message
Proceedings of the 19th Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science
Making Sense of Specifications: The Formalization of SET
Revised Papers from the 8th International Workshop on Security Protocols
Verification of the SSL/TLS Protocol Using a Model Checkable Logic of Belief and Time
SAFECOMP '02 Proceedings of the 21st International Conference on Computer Safety, Reliability and Security
SET Cardholder Registration: The Secrecy Proofs
IJCAR '01 Proceedings of the First International Joint Conference on Automated Reasoning
Suitability of a Classical Analysis Method for E-commerce Protocols
ISC '01 Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Information Security
Inductive verification of smart card protocols
Journal of Computer Security
Evaluation of two security schemes for mobile agents
ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review - Workshop on data communication in Latin America and the Caribbean
Availability of protocol goals
Proceedings of the 2003 ACM symposium on Applied computing
Building reliable, high-performance networks with the Nuprl proof development system
Journal of Functional Programming
A First Step Towards Formal Verification of Security Policy Properties for RBAC
QSIC '04 Proceedings of the Quality Software, Fourth International Conference
Stepwise development of security protocols: a speech act-oriented approach
Proceedings of the 2004 ACM workshop on Formal methods in security engineering
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Using static analysis to validate the SAML single sign-on protocol
WITS '05 Proceedings of the 2005 workshop on Issues in the theory of security
Formal prototyping in early stages of protocol design
WITS '05 Proceedings of the 2005 workshop on Issues in the theory of security
Specification and formal verification of security requirements
CompSysTech '04 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Computer systems and technologies
Organizing Numerical Theories Using Axiomatic Type Classes
Journal of Automated Reasoning
A modular correctness proof of IEEE 802.11i and TLS
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Tailoring the Dolev-Yao abstraction to web services realities
Proceedings of the 2005 workshop on Secure web services
Secure sessions for web services
SWS '04 Proceedings of the 2004 workshop on Secure web service
Computer-assisted verification of a protocol for certified email
Science of Computer Programming - Special issue: Static analysis symposium (SAS 2003)
Performance analysis of TLS Web servers
ACM Transactions on Computer Systems (TOCS)
Secure sessions for Web services
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Enforcing User-Aware Browser-Based Mutual Authentication with Strong Locked Same Origin Policy
ACISP '08 Proceedings of the 13th Australasian conference on Information Security and Privacy
Proceedings of the 15th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Cryptographically verified implementations for TLS
Proceedings of the 15th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Universally Composable Security Analysis of TLS
ProvSec '08 Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on Provable Security
A Modular Security Analysis of the TLS Handshake Protocol
ASIACRYPT '08 Proceedings of the 14th International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security: Advances in Cryptology
STORM: simple tool for resource management
LISA'08 Proceedings of the 22nd conference on Large installation system administration conference
Comparing State Spaces in Automatic Security Protocol Analysis
Formal to Practical Security
Models and Proofs of Protocol Security: A Progress Report
CAV '09 Proceedings of the 21st International Conference on Computer Aided Verification
Liveness Reasoning with Isabelle/HOL
TPHOLs '09 Proceedings of the 22nd International Conference on Theorem Proving in Higher Order Logics
SSL/TLS session-aware user authentication - Or how to effectively thwart the man-in-the-middle
Computer Communications
Computer-assisted verification of a protocol for certified email
SAS'03 Proceedings of the 10th international conference on Static analysis
Formal analysis of the iKP electronic payment protocols
ISSS'02 Proceedings of the 2002 Mext-NSF-JSPS international conference on Software security: theories and systems
A formal analysis for capturing replay attacks in cryptographic protocols
ASIAN'07 Proceedings of the 12th Asian computing science conference on Advances in computer science: computer and network security
Isabelle/HOL: a proof assistant for higher-order logic
Isabelle/HOL: a proof assistant for higher-order logic
A mobile network operator-independent mobile signature service
Journal of Network and Computer Applications
SSL/TLS session-aware user authentication using a GAA bootstrapped key
WISTP'11 Proceedings of the 5th IFIP WG 11.2 international conference on Information security theory and practice: security and privacy of mobile devices in wireless communication
Tunneled TLS for multi-factor authentication
Proceedings of the 11th annual ACM workshop on Digital rights management
Is the verification problem for cryptographic protocols solved?
Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Security Protocols
Verified Cryptographic Implementations for TLS
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC) - Special Issue on Computer and Communications Security
Browser model for security analysis of browser-based protocols
ESORICS'05 Proceedings of the 10th European conference on Research in Computer Security
Analysing TLS in the strand spaces model
Journal of Computer Security
Efficient construction of machine-checked symbolic protocol security proofs
Journal of Computer Security
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Internet browsers use security protocols to protect sensitive messages. An inductive analysis of TLS (a descendant of SSL 3.0) has been performed using the theorem prover Isabelle. Proofs are based on higher-order logic and make no assumptions concerning beliefs of finiteness. All the obvious security goals can be proved; session resumption appears to be secure even if old session keys are compromised. The proofs suggest minor changes to simplify the analysis. TLS, even at an abstract level, is much more complicated than most protocols verified by researchers. Session keys are negotiated rather than distributed, and the protocol has many optional parts. Netherless, the resources needed to verify TLS are modest: six man-weeks of effort and three minutes of processor time.