Cryptographically verified implementations for TLS

  • Authors:
  • Karthikeyan Bhargavan;Cédric Fournet;Ricardo Corin;Eugen Zalinescu

  • Affiliations:
  • Microsoft Research, Cambridge, United Kingdom;Microsoft Research, Cambridge, United Kingdom;MSR-INRIA Joint Centre, Orsay, France;MSR-INRIA Joint Centre, Orsay, France

  • Venue:
  • Proceedings of the 15th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
  • Year:
  • 2008

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Abstract

We intend to narrow the gap between concrete implementations of cryptographic protocols and their verified models. We develop and verify a small functional implementation of the Transport Layer Security protocol (TLS 1.0). We make use of the same executable code for interoperability testing against mainstream implementations, for automated symbolic cryptographic verification, and for automated computational cryptographic verification. We rely on a combination of recent tools, and we also develop a new tool for extracting computational models from executable code. We obtain strong security guarantees for TLS as used in typical deployments.