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SIAM Journal on Computing - Special issue on cryptography
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STOC '89 Proceedings of the twenty-first annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Random oracles are practical: a paradigm for designing efficient protocols
CCS '93 Proceedings of the 1st ACM conference on Computer and communications security
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CCS '98 Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge Proof of Knowledge and Chosen Ciphertext Attack
CRYPTO '91 Proceedings of the 11th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Probabilistic Polynomial-Time Equivalence and Security Analysis
FM '99 Proceedings of the Wold Congress on Formal Methods in the Development of Computing Systems-Volume I - Volume I
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ISW '97 Proceedings of the First International Workshop on Information Security
Universally Composable Security: A New Paradigm for Cryptographic Protocols
FOCS '01 Proceedings of the 42nd IEEE symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
A composable cryptographic library with nested operations
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Symmetric Encryption in a Simulatable Dolev-Yao Style Cryptographic Library
CSFW '04 Proceedings of the 17th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Relating Symbolic and Cryptographic Secrecy
SP '05 Proceedings of the 2005 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
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Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
A Computationally Sound Mechanized Prover for Security Protocols
SP '06 Proceedings of the 2006 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
A probabilistic polynomial-time process calculus for the analysis of cryptographic protocols
Theoretical Computer Science
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CSFW '06 Proceedings of the 19th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Reconciling Two Views of Cryptography (The Computational Soundness of Formal Encryption)
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EUROCRYPT'96 Proceedings of the 15th annual international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
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ESOP'03 Proceedings of the 12th European conference on Programming
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ICALP'05 Proceedings of the 32nd international conference on Automata, Languages and Programming
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ESOP'05 Proceedings of the 14th European conference on Programming Languages and Systems
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ESOP'05 Proceedings of the 14th European conference on Programming Languages and Systems
Machine-checked security proofs of cryptographic signature schemes
ESORICS'05 Proceedings of the 10th European conference on Research in Computer Security
Automated security proofs with sequences of games
CRYPTO'06 Proceedings of the 26th annual international conference on Advances in Cryptology
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Proceedings of the 2008 ACM symposium on Information, computer and communications security
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Proceedings of the 15th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
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Proceedings of the 15th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
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Proceedings of the 36th annual ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages
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LPAR '08 Proceedings of the 15th International Conference on Logic for Programming, Artificial Intelligence, and Reasoning
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Information Security and Cryptology --- ICISC 2008
Security Analysis of Standard Authentication and Key Agreement Protocols Utilising Timestamps
AFRICACRYPT '09 Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on Cryptology in Africa: Progress in Cryptology
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CAV '09 Proceedings of the 21st International Conference on Computer Aided Verification
CoSP: a general framework for computational soundness proofs
Proceedings of the 16th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
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ProvSec'07 Proceedings of the 1st international conference on Provable security
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ICICS'07 Proceedings of the 9th international conference on Information and communications security
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TGC'07 Proceedings of the 3rd conference on Trustworthy global computing
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ESORICS'09 Proceedings of the 14th European conference on Research in computer security
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Proceedings of the 17th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
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Journal of Computer Security - 7th International Workshop on Issues in the Theory of Security (WITS'07)
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Journal of Computer Security - 7th International Workshop on Issues in the Theory of Security (WITS'07)
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ProvSec'10 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Provable security
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USENIX Security'10 Proceedings of the 19th USENIX conference on Security
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Journal of Automated Reasoning
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CRYPTO'11 Proceedings of the 31st annual conference on Advances in cryptology
Computational soundness about formal encryption in the presence of secret shares and key cycles
ICICS'11 Proceedings of the 13th international conference on Information and communications security
Verified Cryptographic Implementations for TLS
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC) - Special Issue on Computer and Communications Security
Formally based semi-automatic implementation of an open security protocol
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Automated security proofs with sequences of games
CRYPTO'06 Proceedings of the 26th annual international conference on Advances in Cryptology
Automated proofs for asymmetric encryption
Concurrency, Compositionality, and Correctness
Security protocol verification: symbolic and computational models
POST'12 Proceedings of the First international conference on Principles of Security and Trust
FC'11 Proceedings of the 2011 international conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security
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Proceedings of the 2012 ACM conference on Computer and communications security
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This paper presents the first automatic technique for proving not only protocols but also primitives in the exact security computational model. Automatic proofs of cryptographic protocols were up to now reserved to the Dolev-Yao model, which however makes quite strong assumptions on the primitives. On the other hand, with the proofs by reductions, in the complexity theoretic framework, more subtle security assumptions can be considered, but security analyses are manual. A process calculus is thus defined in order to take into account the probabilistic semantics of the computational model. It is already rich enough to describe all the usual security notions of both symmetric and asymmetric cryptography, as well as the basic computational assumptions. As an example, we illustrate the use of the new tool with the proof of a quite famous asymmetric primitive: unforgeability under chosen-message attacks (UF-CMA) of the Full-Domain Hash signature scheme under the (trapdoor)-one-wayness of some permutations.