Probabilistic polynomial-time semantics for a protocol security logic

  • Authors:
  • Anupam Datta;Ante Derek;John C. Mitchell;Vitaly Shmatikov;Mathieu Turuani

  • Affiliations:
  • Dept. Computer Science, Stanford University, Stanford, CA;Dept. Computer Science, Stanford University, Stanford, CA;Dept. Computer Science, Stanford University, Stanford, CA;Dept. Computer Science, University of Texas, Austin, TX;LORIA-INRIA Nancy, France

  • Venue:
  • ICALP'05 Proceedings of the 32nd international conference on Automata, Languages and Programming
  • Year:
  • 2005

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Abstract

We describe a cryptographically sound formal logic for proving protocol security properties without explicitly reasoning about probability, asymptotic complexity, or the actions of a malicious attacker. The approach rests on a new probabilistic, polynomial-time semantics for an existing protocol security logic, replacing an earlier semantics that uses nondeterministic symbolic evaluation. While the basic form of the protocol logic remains unchanged from previous work, there are some interesting technical problems involving the difference between efficiently recognizing and efficiently producing a value, and involving a reinterpretation of standard logical connectives that seems necessary to support certain forms of reasoning.