Towards computationally sound symbolic analysis of key exchange protocols

Authors:
Prateek Gupta;Vitaly Shmatikov
Affiliations:
University of Texas at Austin;University of Texas at Austin
Venue:
Proceedings of the 2005 ACM workshop on Formal methods in security engineering
Year:
2005

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Abstract

We present a cryptographically sound formal method for proving correctness of key exchange protocols. Our main tool is a fragment of a symbolic protocol logic. We demonstrate that proofs of key agreement and key secrecy in this logic imply simulatability in Shoup's secure multi-party framework for key exchange. As part of the logic, we present cryptographically sound abstractions of CMA-secure digital signatures and a restricted form of Diffie-Hellman exponentiation, which is a technical result of independent interest. We illustrate our method by constructing a proof of security for a simple authenticated Diffie-Hellman protocol.