Entity authentication and key distribution
CRYPTO '93 Proceedings of the 13th annual international cryptology conference on Advances in cryptology
Temporal verification of reactive systems: safety
Temporal verification of reactive systems: safety
A Machine-Oriented Logic Based on the Resolution Principle
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Logic, Programming, and PROLOG
Logic, Programming, and PROLOG
A Compositional Logic for Protocol Correctness
CSFW '01 Proceedings of the 14th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
A compositional logic for proving security properties of protocols
Journal of Computer Security - Special issue on CSFW14
Abstraction and Refinement in Protocol Derivation
CSFW '04 Proceedings of the 17th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
A modular correctness proof of IEEE 802.11i and TLS
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
A derivation system and compositional logic for security protocols
Journal of Computer Security
Protocol Composition Logic (PCL)
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science (ENTCS)
On the protocol composition logic PCL
Proceedings of the 2008 ACM symposium on Information, computer and communications security
A Correctness Proof of a Mesh Security Architecture
CSF '08 Proceedings of the 2008 21st IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium
Probabilistic polynomial-time semantics for a protocol security logic
ICALP'05 Proceedings of the 32nd international conference on Automata, Languages and Programming
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Protocol composition logic, PCL, is a formal approach for proving security properties of a class of network protocols. PCL involves reasoning directly about properties achieved by protocols steps, in a setting that does not require explicit reasoning about attacker actions. The method relies on protocol invariants to combine properties of different roles of a protocol. While some protocol invariants can be complex to identify and prove, many useful PCL invariants are relatively straightforward consequences of the programs (roles) executed by the agents involved in the protocol. We present a logic program based approach for automating proofs of invariants that appears effective for invariants that are required for several standardized, widely deployed protocols. We use the well-known Transport Layer Security Protocol (TLS/SSL) to illustrate the approach.