ACM Transactions on Computer Systems (TOCS)
A calculus of mobile processes, I
Information and Computation
A compositional protocol verification using relativized bisimulation
Information and Computation
A calculus for cryptographic protocols
Information and Computation
Communicating and mobile systems: the &pgr;-calculus
Communicating and mobile systems: the &pgr;-calculus
Using encryption for authentication in large networks of computers
Communications of the ACM
Action Calculi, or Syntactic Action Structures
MFCS '93 Proceedings of the 18th International Symposium on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science
Breaking and Fixing the Needham-Schroeder Public-Key Protocol Using FDR
TACAs '96 Proceedings of the Second International Workshop on Tools and Algorithms for Construction and Analysis of Systems
Modelling and verifying key-exchange protocols using CSP and FDR
CSFW '95 Proceedings of the 8th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Proving Properties of Security Protocols by Induction
CSFW '97 Proceedings of the 10th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
A Meta-Notation for Protocol Analysis
CSFW '99 Proceedings of the 12th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
On Unifying Some Cryptographic Protocol Logics
SP '94 Proceedings of the 1994 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Automated analysis of cryptographic protocols using Mur/spl phi/
SP '97 Proceedings of the 1997 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Categorical logic of names and abstraction in action calculi
Mathematical Structures in Computer Science
Analyzing security protocols with secrecy types and logic programs
POPL '02 Proceedings of the 29th ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages
Transforming Processes to Check and Ensure Information Flow Security
AMAST '02 Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Algebraic Methodology and Software Technology
Multiset Rewriting and Security Protocol Analysis
RTA '02 Proceedings of the 13th International Conference on Rewriting Techniques and Applications
Types for Cryptographic Protocols
CONCUR '02 Proceedings of the 13th International Conference on Concurrency Theory
Types and Effects for Asymmetric Cryptographic Protocols
CSFW '02 Proceedings of the 15th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Information Flow Security in Dynamic Contexts
CSFW '02 Proceedings of the 15th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Proceedings of the 2003 ACM workshop on Formal methods in security engineering
Analyzing security protocols with secrecy types and logic programs
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
A comparison between strand spaces and multiset rewriting for security protocol analysis
Journal of Computer Security
A modular correctness proof of IEEE 802.11i and TLS
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
A probabilistic polynomial-time process calculus for the analysis of cryptographic protocols
Theoretical Computer Science
Static validation of security protocols
Journal of Computer Security
A derivation system and compositional logic for security protocols
Journal of Computer Security
Compositional analysis of contract-signing protocols
Theoretical Computer Science - Automated reasoning for security protocol analysis
Protocol Composition Logic (PCL)
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science (ENTCS)
Types and effects for asymmetric cryptographic protocols
Journal of Computer Security - Special issue on CSFW15
Preservation of epistemic properties in security protocol implementations
TARK '07 Proceedings of the 11th conference on Theoretical aspects of rationality and knowledge
Automatic verification of cryptographic protocols in first-order logic
ICAI'07 Proceedings of the 8th Conference on 8th WSEAS International Conference on Automation and Information - Volume 8
On the protocol composition logic PCL
Proceedings of the 2008 ACM symposium on Information, computer and communications security
Composable Formal Security Analysis: Juggling Soundness, Simplicity and Efficiency
ICALP '08 Proceedings of the 35th international colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming, Part II
An Automated Approach for Proving PCL Invariants
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science (ENTCS)
Privacy, abstract encryption and protocols: an ASM model - part I
ASM'03 Proceedings of the abstract state machines 10th international conference on Advances in theory and practice
A proof system for information flow security
LOPSTR'02 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Logic based program synthesis and transformation
A logical verification method for security protocols based on linear logic and BAN logic
ISSS'02 Proceedings of the 2002 Mext-NSF-JSPS international conference on Software security: theories and systems
Secrecy analysis in protocol composition logic
ASIAN'06 Proceedings of the 11th Asian computing science conference on Advances in computer science: secure software and related issues
Analysis of EAP-GPSK authentication protocol
ACNS'08 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Applied cryptography and network security
Sequential protocol composition in maude-NPA
ESORICS'10 Proceedings of the 15th European conference on Research in computer security
ICDCIT'12 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Distributed Computing and Internet Technology
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Abstract: We present a specialized protocol logic that is built around a process language for describing the actions of a protocol. In general terms, the relation between logic and protocol is like the relation between assertions in Floyd-Hoare logic and standard imperative programs. Like Floyd-Hoare logic, our logic contains axioms and inference rules for each of the main protocol actions and proofs are protocol-directed, meaning that the outline of a proof of correctness follows the sequence of actions in the protocol. We prove that the protocol logic is sound, in a specific sense: each provable assertion about an action or sequence of actions holds in any run of the protocol, under attack, in which the given actions occur. This approach lets us prove properties of protocols that hold in all runs, while explicitly reasoning only about the sequence of actions needed to achieve this property. In particular, no explicit reasoning about the potential actions of an attacker is required.