Three partition refinement algorithms
SIAM Journal on Computing
A Hookup Theorem for Multilevel Security
IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering
Online minimization of transition systems (extended abstract)
STOC '92 Proceedings of the twenty-fourth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Secure information flow in a multi-threaded imperative language
POPL '98 Proceedings of the 25th ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages
IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering
Verifying Authentication Protocols in CSP
IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering
Secrecy by typing in security protocols
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Communication and Concurrency
Transforming Processes to Check and Ensure Information Flow Security
AMAST '02 Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Algebraic Methodology and Software Technology
Classification of Security Properties (Part I: Information Flow)
FOSAD '00 Revised versions of lectures given during the IFIP WG 1.7 International School on Foundations of Security Analysis and Design on Foundations of Security Analysis and Design: Tutorial Lectures
Unwinding Possibilistic Security Properties
ESORICS '00 Proceedings of the 6th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security
Symbolic Bisimulation Minimisation
CAV '92 Proceedings of the Fourth International Workshop on Computer Aided Verification
Control flow analysis of mobile ambients with security boundaries
FMOODS '02 Proceedings of the IFIP TC6/WG6.1 Fifth International Conference on Formal Methods for Open Object-Based Distributed Systems V
Proving Properties of Security Protocols by Induction
CSFW '97 Proceedings of the 10th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Partial Model Checking and Theorem Proving for Ensuring Security Properties
CSFW '98 Proceedings of the 11th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Probabilistic Noninterference for Multi-Threaded Programs
CSFW '00 Proceedings of the 13th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Possibilistic Definitions of Security - An Assembly Kit
CSFW '00 Proceedings of the 13th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Information Flow Security in Dynamic Contexts
CSFW '02 Proceedings of the 15th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
A Compositional Logic for Protocol Correctness
CSFW '01 Proceedings of the 14th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
A General Theory of Composition for Trace Sets Closed under Selective Interleaving Functions
SP '94 Proceedings of the 1994 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Bisimulation and Unwinding for Verifying Possibilistic Security Properties
VMCAI 2003 Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Verification, Model Checking, and Abstract Interpretation
Non-interference proof technique for the analysis of cryptographic protocols
Journal of Computer Security - Special issue on WITS'03
Unwinding in Information Flow Security
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science (ENTCS)
Verifying persistent security properties
Computer Languages, Systems and Structures
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Persistent_BNDC (P_BNDC, for short) is an information-flow security property for processes in dynamic contexts, i.e., contexts that can be reconfigured at runtime. Intuitively, P_BNDC requires that high level interactions never interfere with the low level behavior of the system, in every possible state. P_BNDC is verified by checking whether the system interacting with a high level component is bisimilar or not to the system in isolation. In this work we contribute to the verification of information-flow security in two respects: (i) we give an unwinding condition that allows us to express P_BNDC in terms of a local property on high level actions and (ii) we exploit this local property in order to define a proof system which provides a very efficient technique for the development and the verification of P_BNDC processes.