Communication and Concurrency
The Theory and Practice of Concurrency
The Theory and Practice of Concurrency
A comparison of three authentication properties
Theoretical Computer Science - Special issue: Algebraic methodology and software technology
Classification of Security Properties (Part I: Information Flow)
FOSAD '00 Revised versions of lectures given during the IFIP WG 1.7 International School on Foundations of Security Analysis and Design on Foundations of Security Analysis and Design: Tutorial Lectures
Unwinding Possibilistic Security Properties
ESORICS '00 Proceedings of the 6th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security
A Framework for the Analysis of Security Protocols
CONCUR '02 Proceedings of the 13th International Conference on Concurrency Theory
On Compositional Reasoning in the Spi-calculus
FoSSaCS '02 Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Foundations of Software Science and Computation Structures
Proof Techniques for Cryptographic Processes
LICS '99 Proceedings of the 14th Annual IEEE Symposium on Logic in Computer Science
Formal Analysis of a Non-Repudiation Protocol
CSFW '98 Proceedings of the 11th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Information Flow Security in Dynamic Contexts
CSFW '02 Proceedings of the 15th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
A fair non-repudiation protocol
SP '96 Proceedings of the 1996 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
NetBill security and transaction protocol
WOEC'95 Proceedings of the 1st conference on USENIX Workshop on Electronic Commerce - Volume 1
A proof system for information flow security
LOPSTR'02 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Logic based program synthesis and transformation
A simple language for real-time cryptographic protocol analysis
ESOP'03 Proceedings of the 12th European conference on Programming
Crossing the syntactic barrier: hom-disequalities for H1-clauses
CIAA'12 Proceedings of the 17th international conference on Implementation and Application of Automata
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Non-interference has been advocated by various authors as a uniform framework for the formal specification of security properties in cryptographic protocols. Unfortunately, specifications based on noninterference are often non-effective, as they require protocol analyses in the presence of all possible intruders.This paper develops new characterizations of non-interference that rely on a finitary representation of intruders. These characterizations draw on equivalence relations built on top of labelled transition systems in which the presence of intruders is accounted for, indirectly, in terms of their (the intruders') knowledge of the protocols' initial data. The new characterizations apply uniformly to trace and bisimulation noninterference, yielding proof techniques for the analysis of various security properties. We demonstrate the effectiveness of such techniques in the analysis of different properties of a fair exchange protocol.