Communication and concurrency
IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering
Verifying Authentication Protocols in CSP
IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering
A calculus for cryptographic protocols
Information and Computation
A compiler for analyzing cryptographic protocols using noninterference
ACM Transactions on Software Engineering and Methodology (TOSEM)
Breaking and Fixing the Needham-Schroeder Public-Key Protocol Using FDR
TACAs '96 Proceedings of the Second International Workshop on Tools and Algorithms for Construction and Analysis of Systems
Reasoning about Cryptographic Protocols in the Spi Calculus
CONCUR '97 Proceedings of the 8th International Conference on Concurrency Theory
A Hierarchy of Authentication Specifications
CSFW '97 Proceedings of the 10th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Formal Analysis of a Non-Repudiation Protocol
CSFW '98 Proceedings of the 11th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Partial Model Checking and Theorem Proving for Ensuring Security Properties
CSFW '98 Proceedings of the 11th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
CVS: A Compiler for the Analysis of Cryptographic Protocols
CSFW '99 Proceedings of the 12th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Process Algebra and Non-interference
CSFW '99 Proceedings of the 12th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Authentication via Localized Names
CSFW '99 Proceedings of the 12th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
What do we mean by entity authentication?
SP '96 Proceedings of the 1996 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Analysis of security protocols as open systems
Theoretical Computer Science
A simple framework for real-time cryptographic protocol analysis with compositional proof rules
Science of Computer Programming - Special issue on 12th European symposium on programming (ESOP 2003)
Non-interference proof technique for the analysis of cryptographic protocols
Journal of Computer Security - Special issue on WITS'03
A semantics for web services authentication
Theoretical Computer Science - Theoretical foundations of security analysis and design II
Injective synchronisation: an extension of the authentication hierarchy
Theoretical Computer Science - Automated reasoning for security protocol analysis
Supporting Secure Coordination in SecSpaces
Fundamenta Informaticae
Process Mining and Security: Detecting Anomalous Process Executions and Checking Process Conformance
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science (ENTCS)
A Formalization of Credit and Responsibility Within the GNDC Schema
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science (ENTCS)
A simple language for real-time cryptographic protocol analysis
ESOP'03 Proceedings of the 12th European conference on Programming
Supporting Secure Coordination in SecSpaces
Fundamenta Informaticae
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Authentication is a slippery security property that has been formally defined only recently; among the recent definitions, two rather interesting ones have been proposed for the spi-calculus by (Abadi and Gordon (in: Proc. CONCUR'97, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 1243, Springer, Berlin, 1997, pp. 59-73; Inform. and Comput. 148(1) (1999) 1-70) and for CSP by Lowe (in: Proc. 10th Computer Security Foundation Workshop, IEEE Press, 1997, pp. 31-43). On the other hand, in a recent paper (in: Proc. World Congr. on Formal Methods (FM'99), Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 1708, Springer, Berlin, 1999, pp. 794-813), we have proved that many existing security properties can be seen uniformly as specific instances of a general scheme based on the idea of non-interference. The purpose of this paper is to show that, under reasonable assumptions, spi-authentication can be recast in this general framework as well, by showing that it is equivalent to the non-interference property called NDC of Focardi and Gorrieri (J. Comput. Security 3(1) (1994/1995) 5-33; IEEE Trans. Software Eng. 23(9) (199) 550-571). This allows for the comparison between such a property and the one based on CSP, which was already recast under the general scheme of Focardi and Martinelli (1999).