ACM Transactions on Computer Systems (TOCS)
Authentication and authenticated key exchanges
Designs, Codes and Cryptography
Comments on the S/KEY user authentication scheme
ACM SIGOPS Operating Systems Review
A calculus for cryptographic protocols
Information and Computation
Encryption and Secure Computer Networks
ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR)
Using encryption for authentication in large networks of computers
Communications of the ACM
Authentication tests and the structure of bundles
Theoretical Computer Science
A new logic for electronic commerce protocols
Theoretical Computer Science - Special issue: Algebraic methodology and software technology
A comparison of three authentication properties
Theoretical Computer Science - Special issue: Algebraic methodology and software technology
Breaking and Fixing the Needham-Schroeder Public-Key Protocol Using FDR
TACAs '96 Proceedings of the Second International Workshop on Tools and Algorithms for Construction and Analysis of Systems
Rewriting for Cryptographic Protocol Verification
CADE-17 Proceedings of the 17th International Conference on Automated Deduction
Intensional specifications of security protocols
CSFW '96 Proceedings of the 9th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
A Hierarchy of Authentication Specifications
CSFW '97 Proceedings of the 10th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Casper: A Compiler for the Analysis of Security Protocols
CSFW '97 Proceedings of the 10th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Athena: a New Efficient Automatic Checker for Security Protocol Analysis
CSFW '99 Proceedings of the 12th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Encryption-based protection for interactive user/computer communication
SIGCOMM '77 Proceedings of the fifth symposium on Data communications
What do we mean by entity authentication?
SP '96 Proceedings of the 1996 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
The modelling and analysis of security protocols: the csp approach
The modelling and analysis of security protocols: the csp approach
Typing one-to-one and one-to-many correspondences in security protocols
ISSS'02 Proceedings of the 2002 Mext-NSF-JSPS international conference on Software security: theories and systems
The AVISPA tool for the automated validation of internet security protocols and applications
CAV'05 Proceedings of the 17th international conference on Computer Aided Verification
Operational semantics of security protocols
SMTT'03 Proceedings of the 2003 international conference on Scenarios: models, Transformations and Tools
A framework for compositional verification of security protocols
Information and Computation
On the relationships between models in protocol verification
Information and Computation
On the protocol composition logic PCL
Proceedings of the 2008 ACM symposium on Information, computer and communications security
Verifying Multi-party Authentication Using Rank Functions and PVS
Formal Aspects in Security and Trust
Comparing State Spaces in Automatic Security Protocol Analysis
Formal to Practical Security
Degrees of security: protocol guarantees in the face of compromising adversaries
CSL'10/EACSL'10 Proceedings of the 24th international conference/19th annual conference on Computer science logic
Provably repairing the ISO/IEC 9798 standard for entity authentication
POST'12 Proceedings of the First international conference on Principles of Security and Trust
Fairness in non-repudiation protocols
STM'11 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Security and Trust Management
Provably repairing the ISO/IEC 9798 standard for entity authentication
Journal of Computer Security - Security and Trust Principles
Efficient construction of machine-checked symbolic protocol security proofs
Journal of Computer Security
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Authentication is one of the foremost goals of many security protocols. It is most often formalised as a form of agreement, which expresses that the communicating partners agree on the values of a number of variables. In this paper we formalise and study an intensional form of authentication which we call synchronisation. Synchronisation expresses that the messages are transmitted exactly as prescribed by the protocol description. Synchronisation is a strictly stronger property than agreement for the standard intruder model, because it can be used to detect preplay attacks. In order to prevent replay attacks on simple protocols, we also define injective synchronisation. Given a synchronising protocol, we show that a sufficient syntactic criterion exists that guarantees that the protocol is injective as well.