A lesson on authentication protocol design
ACM SIGOPS Operating Systems Review
A Formal Language for Cryptographic Protocol Requirements
Designs, Codes and Cryptography - Special issue dedicated to Gustavus J. Simmons
ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR)
Term rewriting and all that
The inductive approach to verifying cryptographic protocols
Journal of Computer Security
Constraint solving for bounded-process cryptographic protocol analysis
CCS '01 Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Computer and Communications Security
ESORICS '00 Proceedings of the 6th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security
Automated Unbounded Verification of Security Protocols
CAV '02 Proceedings of the 14th International Conference on Computer Aided Verification
Rewriting for Cryptographic Protocol Verification
CADE-17 Proceedings of the 17th International Conference on Automated Deduction
A Hierarchy of Authentication Specifications
CSFW '97 Proceedings of the 10th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Towards Automatic Verification of Authentication Protocols on an Unbounded Network
CSFW '00 Proceedings of the 13th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
An Efficient Cryptographic Protocol Verifier Based on Prolog Rules
CSFW '01 Proceedings of the 14th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Analyzing security protocols with secrecy types and logic programs
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
A comparison between strand spaces and multiset rewriting for security protocol analysis
Journal of Computer Security
Security protocols: from linear to classical logic by abstract interpretation
Information Processing Letters
Pattern-based abstraction for verifying secrecy in protocols
International Journal on Software Tools for Technology Transfer (STTT) - Special section on Tools and Algorithms for the Construction and Analysis of Systems
Injective synchronisation: an extension of the authentication hierarchy
Theoretical Computer Science - Automated reasoning for security protocol analysis
Higher-Order and Symbolic Computation
The ASW Protocol Revisited: A Unified View
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science (ENTCS)
Security properties: two agents are sufficient
ESOP'03 Proceedings of the 12th European conference on Programming
The AVISPA tool for the automated validation of internet security protocols and applications
CAV'05 Proceedings of the 17th international conference on Computer Aided Verification
Verifying the SET registration protocols
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Abstraction by set-membership: verifying security protocols and web services with databases
Proceedings of the 17th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Integrating automated and interactive protocol verification
FAST'09 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Formal Aspects in Security and Trust
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We formally investigate the relationships between several models that are widely used in protocol verification, namely variants of the inductive model of message traces inspired by Paulson's approach, and models based on rewriting. More precisely, we prove several over-approximation relationships between models, i.e. that one model allows strictly more traces or reachable states than the other. This is common in verification: often an over-approximation is easier to prove correct than the original model, and proving that the over-approximation is safe implies that the original model is safe-provided that the models are indeed in an over-approximation relation. We then show that some over-approximations are not sound with respect to a common formalization of authentication goals based on exchanged messages. The precise formal account that we give on the relation of the models allows us to correct the situation.