Typing one-to-one and one-to-many correspondences in security protocols

Authors:
Andrew D. Gordon;Alan Jeffrey
Affiliations:
Microsoft Research;DePaul University
Venue:
ISSS'02 Proceedings of the 2002 Mext-NSF-JSPS international conference on Software security: theories and systems
Year:
2002

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Abstract

Both one-to-one and one-to-many correspondences between events, sometimes known as injective and non-injective agreements, respectively, are widely used to specify correctness properties of cryptographic protocols. In earlier work, we showed how to typecheck one-to-one correspondences for protocols expressed in the spi-calculus. We present a new type and effect system able to verify both one-to-one and one-to-many correspondences.