A process algebra for timed systems
Information and Computation
Prudent Engineering Practice for Cryptographic Protocols
IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering
A calculus for cryptographic protocols
Information and Computation
Secrecy by typing in security protocols
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
The inductive approach to verifying cryptographic protocols
Journal of Computer Security
Timestamps in key distribution protocols
Communications of the ACM
Using encryption for authentication in large networks of computers
Communications of the ACM
Analysing Time Dependent Security Properties in CSP Using PVS
ESORICS '00 Proceedings of the 6th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security
Secrecy Types for Asymmetric Communication
FoSSaCS '01 Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Foundations of Software Science and Computation Structures
How to Prevent Type Flaw Attacks on Security Protocols
CSFW '00 Proceedings of the 13th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Authenticity by typing for security protocols
Journal of Computer Security - Special issue on CSFW14
Secrecy despite compromise: types, cryptography, and the pi-calculus
CONCUR 2005 - Concurrency Theory
Types and effects for asymmetric cryptographic protocols
Journal of Computer Security - Special issue on CSFW15
The modelling and analysis of security protocols: the csp approach
The modelling and analysis of security protocols: the csp approach
Typing one-to-one and one-to-many correspondences in security protocols
ISSS'02 Proceedings of the 2002 Mext-NSF-JSPS international conference on Software security: theories and systems
A simple language for real-time cryptographic protocol analysis
ESOP'03 Proceedings of the 12th European conference on Programming
Information and Computation
Proceedings of the 15th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Timed calculus of cryptographic communication
FAST'06 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Formal aspects in security and trust
Dynamic access control in a concurrent object calculus
CONCUR'06 Proceedings of the 17th international conference on Concurrency Theory
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We present a discretely timed spi-calculus. A primitive for key compromise allows us to model key compromise attacks, thus going beyond the standard Dolev-Yao attacker model. A primitive for reading a global clock allows us to express protocols based on timestamps, which are common in practice. We accompany the timed spi-calculus with a type system, prove that well-typed protocols are robustly safe for secrecy and authenticity and present examples of well-typed protocols as well as an example where failure to typecheck reveals a (well-known) flaw.