Prudent Engineering Practice for Cryptographic Protocols
IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering
An approach to the formal verification of cryptographic protocols
CCS '96 Proceedings of the 3rd ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Term rewriting and all that
Verifying Authentication Protocols in CSP
IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering
A calculus for cryptographic protocols
Information and Computation
Secrecy by typing in security protocols
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Casper: a compiler for the analysis of security protocols
Journal of Computer Security
The inductive approach to verifying cryptographic protocols
Journal of Computer Security
Mobile values, new names, and secure communication
POPL '01 Proceedings of the 28th ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages
Analyzing security protocols with secrecy types and logic programs
POPL '02 Proceedings of the 29th ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages
Analysis of security protocols as open systems
Theoretical Computer Science
Breaking and Fixing the Needham-Schroeder Public-Key Protocol Using FDR
TACAs '96 Proceedings of the Second International Workshop on Tools and Algorithms for Construction and Analysis of Systems
On Name Generation and Set-Based Analysis in the Dolev-Yao Model
CONCUR '02 Proceedings of the 13th International Conference on Concurrency Theory
Modelling and verifying key-exchange protocols using CSP and FDR
CSFW '95 Proceedings of the 8th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
A Meta-Notation for Protocol Analysis
CSFW '99 Proceedings of the 12th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
TAPS: A First-Order Verifier for Cryptographic Protocols
CSFW '00 Proceedings of the 13th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Towards Automatic Verification of Authentication Protocols on an Unbounded Network
CSFW '00 Proceedings of the 13th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
How to Prevent Type Flaw Attacks on Security Protocols
CSFW '00 Proceedings of the 13th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
An Efficient Cryptographic Protocol Verifier Based on Prolog Rules
CSFW '01 Proceedings of the 14th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
A Semantic Model for Authentication Protocols
SP '93 Proceedings of the 1993 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Authenticity by typing for security protocols
Journal of Computer Security - Special issue on CSFW14
Authenticity by tagging and typing
Proceedings of the 2004 ACM workshop on Formal methods in security engineering
Secrecy despite compromise: types, cryptography, and the pi-calculus
CONCUR 2005 - Concurrency Theory
Timed spi-calculus with types for secrecy and authenticity
CONCUR 2005 - Concurrency Theory
Types and effects for asymmetric cryptographic protocols
Journal of Computer Security - Special issue on CSFW15
Typing one-to-one and one-to-many correspondences in security protocols
ISSS'02 Proceedings of the 2002 Mext-NSF-JSPS international conference on Software security: theories and systems
A calculus of challenges and responses
Proceedings of the 2007 ACM workshop on Formal methods in security engineering
A formal semantics for protocol narrations
Theoretical Computer Science
ICALP '08 Proceedings of the 35th international colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming, Part II
Proceedings of the 15th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Proceedings of the 15th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Is cryptyc able to detect insider attacks?
FAST'11 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Formal Aspects of Security and Trust
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Cryptographic protocols often make use of nested cryptographic primitives, for example signed message digests, or encrypted signed messages. Gordon and Jeffrey's prior work on types for authenticity did not allow for such nested cryptography. In this work, we present the pattern-matching spi-calculus, which is an obvious extension of the spi-calculus to include pattern-matching as primitive. The novelty of the language is in the accompanying type system, which uses the same language of patterns to describe complex data dependencies which cannot be described using prior type systems. We show that any appropriately typed process is guaranteed to satisfy robust authenticity, secrecy and integrity properties.