Automatic SAT-Compilation of Protocol Insecurity Problems via Reduction to Planning
FORTE '02 Proceedings of the 22nd IFIP WG 6.1 International Conference Houston on Formal Techniques for Networked and Distributed Systems
From Secrecy to Authenticity in Security Protocols
SAS '02 Proceedings of the 9th International Symposium on Static Analysis
SET Cardholder Registration: The Secrecy Proofs
IJCAR '01 Proceedings of the First International Joint Conference on Automated Reasoning
Proving Secrecy is Easy Enough
CSFW '01 Proceedings of the 14th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Authenticity by Typing for Security Protocols
CSFW '01 Proceedings of the 14th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Authenticity by typing for security protocols
Journal of Computer Security - Special issue on CSFW14
On the automated implementation of modal logics used to verify security protocols
ISICT '03 Proceedings of the 1st international symposium on Information and communication technologies
A semantics for web services authentication
Proceedings of the 31st ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages
Multiset rewriting and the complexity of bounded security protocols
Journal of Computer Security
Accountability protocols: Formalized and verified
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Information and Computation
Understanding the intruder through attacks on cryptographic protocols
Proceedings of the 44th annual Southeast regional conference
A semantics for web services authentication
Theoretical Computer Science - Theoretical foundations of security analysis and design II
Verification of cryptographic protocols: tagging enforces termination
Theoretical Computer Science - Foundations of software science and computation structures
Secure sessions for Web services
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Automatic verification of cryptographic protocols in first-order logic
ICAI'07 Proceedings of the 8th Conference on 8th WSEAS International Conference on Automation and Information - Volume 8
Verifying Security Protocols Modelled by Networks of Automata
Fundamenta Informaticae - Special Issue on Concurrency Specification and Programming (CS&P)
SAT-Based Verification of Security Protocols Via Translation to Networks of Automata
Model Checking and Artificial Intelligence
Exploring the Design Space for Network Protocol Stacks on Special-Purpose Embedded Systems
SEUS '09 Proceedings of the 7th IFIP WG 10.2 International Workshop on Software Technologies for Embedded and Ubiquitous Systems
Modular verification of security protocol code by typing
Proceedings of the 37th annual ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages
Verification of cryptographic Protocols: tagging enforces termination
FOSSACS'03/ETAPS'03 Proceedings of the 6th International conference on Foundations of Software Science and Computation Structures and joint European conference on Theory and practice of software
RTA'03 Proceedings of the 14th international conference on Rewriting techniques and applications
Verification of authentication protocols based on the binding relation
ISSS'02 Proceedings of the 2002 Mext-NSF-JSPS international conference on Software security: theories and systems
Is the verification problem for cryptographic protocols solved?
Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Security Protocols
Verifying Security Protocols Modelled by Networks of Automata
Fundamenta Informaticae - Special Issue on Concurrency Specification and Programming (CS&P)
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We describe a proof method for cryptographic protocols, based on a strong secrecy invariant that catalogues conditions under which messages can be published. For typical protocols, a suitable first-order invariant can be generated automatically from the program text, independent of the properties being verified, allowing safety properties to be proved by ordinary first-order reasoning.We have implemented the method in an automatic verifier, TAPS, that proves safety properties roughly equivalent to those in published Isabelle verifications, but does so much faster (usually within a few seconds) and with little or no guidance from the user. We have used TAPS to analyze about 60 protocols, including all but three protocols from the Clark & Jacob survey; on average, these verifications each require less than 4 seconds of CPU time and less than 4 bytes of hints from the user.