The inductive approach to verifying cryptographic protocols
Journal of Computer Security
Certified email with a light on-line trusted third party: design and implementation
Proceedings of the 11th international conference on World Wide Web
Inductive verification of smart card protocols
Journal of Computer Security
Formal Analysis of a Non-Repudiation Protocol
CSFW '98 Proceedings of the 11th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
TAPS: A First-Order Verifier for Cryptographic Protocols
CSFW '00 Proceedings of the 13th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
An Efficient Cryptographic Protocol Verifier Based on Prolog Rules
CSFW '01 Proceedings of the 14th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
A fair non-repudiation protocol
SP '96 Proceedings of the 1996 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Fair certified e-mail delivery
Proceedings of the 2004 ACM symposium on Applied computing
The modelling and analysis of security protocols: the csp approach
The modelling and analysis of security protocols: the csp approach
Computer-assisted verification of a protocol for certified email
SAS'03 Proceedings of the 10th international conference on Static analysis
Isabelle/HOL: a proof assistant for higher-order logic
Isabelle/HOL: a proof assistant for higher-order logic
Distributed support for public and private accountability in digital ecosystems
Proceedings of the International Conference on Management of Emergent Digital EcoSystems
Accountability: definition and relationship to verifiability
Proceedings of the 17th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
A new method for formalizing optimistic fair exchange protocols
ICICS'10 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Information and communications security
Complexity of fairness constraints for the Dolev-Yao attacker model
Proceedings of the 2011 ACM Symposium on Applied Computing
Towards a formal model of accountability
Proceedings of the 2011 workshop on New security paradigms workshop
Accountability and deterrence in online life
Proceedings of the 3rd International Web Science Conference
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Classical security protocols aim to achieve authentication and confidentiality under the assumption that the peers behave honestly. Some recent protocols are required to achieve their goals even if the peer misbehaves. Accountability is a protocol design strategy that may help. It delivers to peers sufficient evidence of each other's participation in the protocol. Accountability underlies the nonrepudiation protocol of Zhou and Gollmann and the certified email protocol of Abadi et al. This paper provides a comparative, formal analysis of the two protocols, and confirms that they reach their goals under realistic conditions. The treatment, which is conducted with mechanized support from the proof assistant Isabelle, requires various extensions to the existing analysis method. A byproduct is an account of the concept of higher-level protocol.