Provably secure session key distribution: the three party case
STOC '95 Proceedings of the twenty-seventh annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
A probabilistic poly-time framework for protocol analysis
CCS '98 Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
A calculus for cryptographic protocols
Information and Computation
The inductive approach to verifying cryptographic protocols
Journal of Computer Security
Mobile values, new names, and secure communication
POPL '01 Proceedings of the 28th ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages
Automated protocol verification in linear logic
Proceedings of the 4th ACM SIGPLAN international conference on Principles and practice of declarative programming
Finite-State Analysis of Security Protocols
CAV '98 Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Computer Aided Verification
Towards an Automatic Analysis of Security Protocols in First-Order Logic
CADE-16 Proceedings of the 16th International Conference on Automated Deduction: Automated Deduction
Abstracting Cryptographic Protocols with Tree Automata
SAS '99 Proceedings of the 6th International Symposium on Static Analysis
A Meta-Notation for Protocol Analysis
CSFW '99 Proceedings of the 12th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
TAPS: A First-Order Verifier for Cryptographic Protocols
CSFW '00 Proceedings of the 13th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
An Efficient Cryptographic Protocol Verifier Based on Prolog Rules
CSFW '01 Proceedings of the 14th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
A Compositional Logic for Protocol Correctness
CSFW '01 Proceedings of the 14th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Automated analysis of cryptographic protocols using Mur/spl phi/
SP '97 Proceedings of the 1997 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
SP'96 Proceedings of the 1996 IEEE conference on Security and privacy
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In this paper, a new first-order logical framework and method of formalizing and verifying cryptographic protocols is presented. From the point of view of an intruder, the protocol and abilities of the intruder are modeled in Horn clauses. Based on deductive reasoning method, secrecy of cryptographic protocols is verified automatically, and if the secrecy is violated, attack scenarios can be presented through back-tracing. The method has been implemented in an automatic verifier, many examples of protocols have been analyzed in less then 1s.