SAT-Based Verification of Security Protocols Via Translation to Networks of Automata

Authors:
Mirosław Kurkowski;Wojciech Penczek;Andrzej Zbrzezny
Affiliations:
Institute of Mathematics and Computer Science, Jan Długosz University, Armii Krajowej 13/15, 42-200 Czestochowa,;Institute of Computer Science, PAS, Ordona 21, 01-237 Warsaw, Poland and Institute of Informatics, Podlasie Academy, Sienkiewicza 51, 08-110 Siedlce, Poland;Institute of Mathematics and Computer Science, Jan Długosz University, Armii Krajowej 13/15, 42-200 Czestochowa,
Venue:
Model Checking and Artificial Intelligence
Year:
2007

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Abstract

In this paper we show a novel method for modelling behaviours of security protocols using networks of communicating automata in order to verify them with SAT-based bounded model checking. These automata correspond to executions of the participants as well as to their knowledge about letters. Given a bounded number of sessions, we can verify both correctness or incorrectness of a security protocol proving either reachability or unreachability of an undesired state. We exemplify all our notions on the Needham Schroeder Public Key Authentication Protocol (NSPK) and show experimental results for checking authentication using the verification tool VerICS.