Is your security protocol on time?

  • Authors:
  • Gizela Jakubowska;Wojciech Penczek

  • Affiliations:
  • Szczecin University of Technology, Faculty of Computer Science and Information Systems;Institute of Computer Science, PAS and Institute of Informatics, Podlasie Academy

  • Venue:
  • FSEN'07 Proceedings of the 2007 international conference on Fundamentals of software engineering
  • Year:
  • 2007

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Abstract

In this paper we offer a novel methodology for verifying correctness of (timed) security protocols. The idea consists in computing the time of a correct execution of a session and finding out whether the Intruder can change it to shorter or longer by an active attack. Moreover, we generalize the correspondence property so that attacks can be also discovered when some time constraints are not satisfied. As case studies we verify generalized authentication of KERBEROS, TMN, Neumann Stubblebine Protocol, Andrew Secure Protocol, WMF, and NSPK.