A simple framework for real-time cryptographic protocol analysis with compositional proof rules

  • Authors:
  • Roberto Gorrieri;Fabio Martinelli

  • Affiliations:
  • Dipartimento di Scienze dell'Informazione, Università di Bologna, Mura Anteo Zamboni 7, Bologna I-40127, Italy;Istituto di Informatica e Telematica C.N.R., Pisa, Italy

  • Venue:
  • Science of Computer Programming - Special issue on 12th European symposium on programming (ESOP 2003)
  • Year:
  • 2004

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Abstract

A real-time process algebra, enhanced with specific constructs for handling cryptographic primitives, is proposed to model cryptographic protocols in a simple way. We show that some security properties, such as authentication and secrecy, can be re-formulated in this timed setting. Moreover, we show that they can be seen as suitable instances of a general information flow-like scheme, called timed generalized non-deducibility on compositions (tGNDC), parametric w.r.t. the observational semantics of interest. We show that, when considering timed trace semantics. there exists a most powerful hostile environment (or enemy) that can try to compromise the protocol. Moreover, we present a couple of compositionality results for tGNDC, one of which is time dependent, and show their usefulness by means of a case study.