Transition system specifications with negative premises (extended abstract)
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Fundamenta Informaticae - Concurrency Specification and Programming (CS&P)
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Fundamenta Informaticae - Concurrency Specification and Programming (CS&P)
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Fundamenta Informaticae - Concurrency Specification and Programming CS&P
Fundamenta Informaticae - Concurrency, Specification and Programming
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Formalisms for description how much information on private actions can be obtained by observing public ones are presented. Two sets of private actions are considered. The set of actions which execution is guaranteed according to observations and the set of actions which execution is excluded according to observations. Since information flows could be realized also by means of different covert channels as time, termination and divergence this possibility is considered as well. Both qualitative and quantitative dimensions of the flow are considered.