Timing Attacks on Implementations of Diffie-Hellman, RSA, DSS, and Other Systems

  • Authors:
  • Paul C. Kocher

  • Affiliations:
  • -

  • Venue:
  • CRYPTO '96 Proceedings of the 16th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
  • Year:
  • 1996

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Abstract

By carefully measuring the amount of time required tm perform private key operalions, attackers may be able to find fixed Diffie-Hellman exponents, factor RSA keys, and break other cryptosystems. Against, a valnerable system, the attack is computationally inexpensive and often requires only known ciphertext. Actual systems are potentially at risk, including cryptographic tokens, network-based cryptosystems, and other applications where attackers can make reasonably accurate timing measurements. Techniques for preventing the attack for RSA and Diffie-Hellman are presented. Some cryptosystems will need to be revised to protect against the attack, and new protocols and algorithms may need to incorporate measures to prevenl timing attacks.