On Insecurity of the Side Channel Attack Countermeasure Using Addition-Subtraction Chains under Distinguishability between Addition and Doubling

  • Authors:
  • Katsuyuki Okeya;Kouichi Sakurai

  • Affiliations:
  • -;-

  • Venue:
  • ACISP '02 Proceedings of the 7th Australian Conference on Information Security and Privacy
  • Year:
  • 2002

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Abstract

We show that a randomized addition-subtraction chains countermeasure against side channel attacks is vulnerable to SPA attack, a kind of side channel attack, under distinguishability between addition and doubling. A side channel attackis an attackthat takes advantage of information leaked during execution of a cryptographic procedure. The randomized addition-subtraction chains countermeasure has been proposed by Oswald-Aigner, and is a random decision inserted into computations. However, its immunity to side channel attacks is still controversial. As for timing attack, a kind of side channel attack, the randomized addition-subtraction chains countermeasure is also vulnerable. Moreover, compared with other countermeasures against side channel attacks, the randomized addition-subtraction chains countermeasure, after being improved to prevent side channel attacks, is much slower.