Use of elliptic curves in cryptography
Lecture notes in computer sciences; 218 on Advances in cryptology---CRYPTO 85
Examining Smart-Card Security under the Threat of Power Analysis Attacks
IEEE Transactions on Computers
ACISP '02 Proceedings of the 7th Australian Conference on Information Security and Privacy
CRYPTO '99 Proceedings of the 19th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Power Analysis Breaks Elliptic Curve Cryptosystems even Secure against the Timing Attack
INDOCRYPT '00 Proceedings of the First International Conference on Progress in Cryptology
Weierstraß Elliptic Curves and Side-Channel Attacks
PKC '02 Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Practice and Theory in Public Key Cryptosystems: Public Key Cryptography
A Refined Power-Analysis Attack on Elliptic Curve Cryptosystems
PKC '03 Proceedings of the 6th International Workshop on Theory and Practice in Public Key Cryptography: Public Key Cryptography
Power Analysis Attacks of Modular Exponentiation in Smartcards
CHES '99 Proceedings of the First International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Resistance against Differential Power Analysis for Elliptic Curve Cryptosystems
CHES '99 Proceedings of the First International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Randomized Addition-Subtraction Chains as a Countermeasure against Power Attacks
CHES '01 Proceedings of the Third International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Protections against Differential Analysis for Elliptic Curve Cryptography
CHES '01 Proceedings of the Third International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Randomized Signed-Scalar Multiplication of ECC to Resist Power Attacks
CHES '02 Revised Papers from the 4th International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Low-Cost Solutions for Preventing Simple Side-Channel Analysis: Side-Channel Atomicity
IEEE Transactions on Computers
On second-order differential power analysis
CHES'05 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Cryptographic hardware and embedded systems
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In ICICS'04, Sim et al. proposed an attack against the full version of Ha-Moon's countermeasure which is one of enhanced countermeasures. The analysis technique is based on the fact that the probability for the appearance of an intermediate value is p=1/2. By our simulations, however, it is proven to be not true. Thus sometimes the output of their attack might be wrong because there exists the case that the probability p is so small that they can make a wrong decision. In this paper we repair the above attack, and then propose a generic analytical technique applicable to all BSD type countermeasures combined with some simple power analysis countermeasures. In order to show that the proposed attack is as practical as the usual differential power analysis (DPA), we estimate the number of samples and computational cost. Furthermore, we enhance the proposed attack in two ways such that it works against right-to-left algorithm in a simpler and more efficient way, and also works against one combined with an extra DPA countermeasure.